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Abstract 
 
The interpretation of emotionally ambiguous words, sentences, or scenarios can 
be biased through training procedures that are collectively called Cognitive Bias 
Modification for Interpretation (CBM-I). Little CBM-I research has examined the 
underlying mechanisms responsible for the induction of emotional interpretive 
biases, or the potential for this line of enquiry to inform psycholinguistic models 
of meaning activation and selection. In this thesis a novel CBM-I paradigm was 
developed and then systematically manipulated in order to discriminate between 
two mechanistic accounts of changes in interpretive bias – the Emotional Priming 
Account and the Ambiguity Resolution Account. In Experiment 1 participants 
completed word fragments that were consistently related to either a negative or 
benign interpretation of an ambiguous sentence. In a subsequent semantic 
priming task they demonstrated an interpretation bias, in that they were faster to 
judge the relatedness of targets that were associated with the training-congruent 
than the training-incongruent meaning of an emotionally ambiguous homograph. 
In Experiment 2 the time between the presentation of the prime and the target 
(Stimulus Onset Asynchrony; SOA) at test was shortened. Interpretive biases 
were not observed at a short SOA suggesting that training did not induce biases 
at an early lexical activation stage. Interpretive bias was then eliminated when 
participants simply completed valenced word fragments (Experiment 3) or 
completed fragments related to emotional but unambiguous sentences 
(Experiment 4) during training. Only when participants were required to actively 
resolve emotionally ambiguous sentences during training did changes in 
interpretation emerge at test. These findings suggest that CBM-I achieves its 
effects by altering a production rule that aids the selection of a single meaning 
from alternatives, in line with an Ambiguity Resolution account.  Finally, no 
interpretive biases were observed when the task in the test phase was 
substituted with a lexical decision task (Experiment 5). Participants only showed 
biases in the selection of meanings when the test phase encouraged them to 
interpret the prime. This pattern of results suggests that the alteration of 
selection patterns in word recognition depend on the strategies employed by 
participants in the test phase. Overall the findings are discussed with regards to 
the Ambiguity Resolution and Emotional Priming accounts of modified 
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interpretive biases. Implications for current psycholinguistic models of meaning 
activation and selection are considered.  
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Chapter 1: General Introduction 
 Emotional ambiguity is a feature of most, if not all, social interactions. 
Imagine that a friend expresses their surprise to see you at their party. Do you 
take this to mean that they are pleased to see you, or do you conclude that they 
are unhappy with your presence at their event? How you interpret this scenario 
will depend on many linguistic, individual and situational factors, including your 
mood at the time, your friend’s tone of voice, and the nature of your friendship 
(Eysenck, Mogg, May, Richards & Mathews, 1991; Halberstadt, Niedenthal & 
Kushner, 1995; Nygaard & Lunders, 2002). You are also more likely to pick one 
emotional interpretation over another if you have a stable pre-existing 
interpretation bias. Typically, healthy people have a slight positivity bias; this 
means they are more likely (than not) to interpret their friend’s words in a 
positive way. However, some individuals carry a negative bias, so they are more 
likely to interpret their friend’s surprise as disappointment. Negative 
interpretive biases are common in individuals with anxiety and depression 
(Butler & Mathews, 1983; Hirsch & Mathews, 1997; Lawson, MacLeod & 
Hammond, 2002 for a review see Blanchette & Richards, 2010) and they are 
considered in many models of mental illness to be instrumental in the onset and 
maintenance of emotional disorders (e.g., Beck, 1991; Blanchette & Richards, 
2010; Bower, 1981; Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). As a result, a 
novel psychological intervention has been developed that aims to alter negative 
psychological outcomes by altering interpretive biases.   
Cognitive Bias Modification for Interpretation (CBM-I) is a computerised 
training program that directly manipulates people’s interpretive biases and then 
examines the resulting effects on their mood, symptoms of emotional distress or 
emotional reactivity (Grey & Mathews, 2000; Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000; for 
reviews see Koster, Fox & MacLeod, 2009; Woud & Becker, 2014). A typical CBM-
I paradigm consists of a training phase to bias the interpretation of emotional 
ambiguity in a negative or a benign1 manner. Following training, changes in 
                                                        
1 “Benign” training is used to describe training that contains both positive and 
neutral stimuli. Typically, training paradigms have negative and benign (instead 
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participants’ mood, emotional reactivity or stress tolerance are assessed in order 
to determine the causal relationship between interpretive biases and symptoms 
of mood disorders. Overall, the research suggests that inducing a negative 
interpretive bias increases symptoms associated with depression and anxiety, 
and inducing a benign bias alleviates such symptoms (Hallion & Ruscio, 2011; 
Mene-Lothmann, et al., 2014).  CBM-I is thought to induce these changes in 
emotional processes by altering the way ambiguous (but potentially emotional) 
stimuli or events are interpreted. In this thesis, I explore the mechanisms by 
which training changes interpretation. 
Cognitive Bias Modification for Interpretation 
Two studies stand out as seminal in the CBM-I literature, and serve to 
illustrate two broad classes of paradigms that have been used to manipulate 
interpretive bias. The first study to administer CBM-I to healthy participants and 
induce a change in interpretive bias was conducted by Grey and Mathews (2000). 
In a series of experiments they first trained participants to resolve emotionally 
ambiguous homographs in either a negative or a benign manner. Participants in 
the negative training condition repeatedly saw ambiguous primes and solved 
word fragments related to their negative interpretation e.g.,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Typical single word negative training trial (adapted from Grey & 
Mathews, 2000) 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
of positive) training conditions, due in part, to the limitations associated with 
using ambiguous stimuli (i.e., a limited number of ambiguous words have both a 
negative and a positive, or a negative and a neutral interpretation). Some studies 
do use a positive training condition and the distinction is referenced explicitly in 
this thesis. 
Terminal 
C_ncer 
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Participants in the benign training condition solved word fragments related to 
the ambiguous prime’s benign interpretation e.g.,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Typical single word benign training trial (adapted from Grey & 
Mathews, 2000) 
 
Following training, participants completed a test phase that required 
them to solve a further set of word fragments, which were related to either the 
negative or benign interpretation of the ambiguous prime. Participants showed a 
training valence by target valence interaction that is the hallmark of interpretive 
bias modification. Participants in the negative training condition were faster to 
complete negative word fragments relative to benign word fragments, whereas 
participants in the benign training showed a non-significant advantage to 
complete fragments that reflected benign interpretations of ambiguous primes. 
In Experiment 2, participants completed the same fragment completion task in 
the training phase but completed a primed lexical decision task in the test phase. 
Participants saw emotionally ambiguous homograph primes, followed 750ms 
later by a target that was either a word or a non-word. Word targets were either 
negative or benign associates of the ambiguous primes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Terminal 
A_rport 
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Participants indicated whether the target was a word or a non-word e.g.,  
 
 
 
 
 
Non-word Trial     Word Trial 
Figure 3. Lexical Decision trials for words and non-words in a CBM-I test phase 
(adapted from Grey and Mathews, 2000). 
 
The results of the second experiment were similar to those of Experiment 
1; participants in the negative training condition were faster to make lexical 
decisions to training-congruent target words following ambiguous primes, 
whereas those in the benign training showed no advantage for either valence. 
The authors concluded that negative interpretive biases normally seen in clinical 
populations could be mirrored in a healthy sample after a short application of 
CBM-I training.   
A second approach developed by Mathews and Mackintosh (2000) used a 
scenario-based training method. They used emotional scenarios in the training 
phase to shift interpretive biases, and a recognition task at test to assess it. 
During training, participants read ambiguous scenarios that were consistently 
resolved in either a negative or a positive manner by solving a final word 
fragment e.g.,    
The Dinner Party 
Your partner asks you to go to an anniversary dinner that their company is holding. 
You have not met any of their work colleagues before. Getting ready to go, you think 
that the new people you will meet will find you: 
 (B_r_ng/Boring: Negative Training Condition)  
(Fr_end_y/Friendly: Positive Training Condition). 
 
 
Fall 
Dwon 
Fall 
Collapse or 
Autumn 
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Following several of these scenarios, participants were presented with a 
booklet containing a series of critical scenarios in which the word fragment did 
not resolve the ambiguity of the situation.  This was considered to be the first 
stage of the test phase e.g.,  
The wedding reception 
Your friend asks you to give a speech at her wedding reception. You prepare some 
remarks and when the time comes, get to your feet. As you speak, you notice some 
people in the audience start to l__gh (laugh). 
 
Note that the completion (laugh) does not resolve the scenario as either 
positive or negative; the resolution depends on the participant’s interpretation. 
After a delay, participants were presented with a second booklet containing four 
possible interpretations of each critical scenario; these included two target 
sentences that reflected a possible positive or negative interpretation, and two 
foil sentences that were also positive or negative but not clearly related to the 
scenario. Participants were asked to rate each sentence in terms of how similar 
they were to the original critical scenario. e.g.,  
 
The wedding reception. 
As you speak, some people in the audience start to yawn. (negative foil) 
As you speak, people in the audience applaud your comments. (positive foil) 
As you speak, people in the audience find your efforts pathetic. (negative target) 
As you speak, people in the audience laugh appreciatively. (positive target) 
 
Because the critical scenarios were ambiguous, both negative and benign 
targets reflected a possible interpretation that could have been drawn from the 
scenario. Therefore, repeatedly ranking targets of a particular valence as being 
more similar than the alternative valence would be evidence of an induced 
interpretive change. Participants in the negative training condition reported 
higher similarity ratings for negative test sentences over positive test sentences, 
and vice versa for participants who received positive training (with a strong 
tendency for all participants to endorse possible interpretations over foils). 
Participants in the negative training condition also reported higher levels of 
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anxiety following training relative to their positively trained counterparts (who 
showed non-significant alleviations in anxiety symptoms). This suggests that 
repeatedly reading and completing ambiguous scenarios successfully modified 
training-congruent interpretive biases, which were linked to negative mood 
states. Results from both Grey and Matthews (2000) and Mathews and 
Mackintosh (2000) suggest that interpretive biases (and resulting differences in 
state anxiety) can be shifted by consistently training participants to disambiguate 
emotionally ambiguous words or scenarios towards a particular valence.  
A large number of CBM-I studies have been conducted in the last decade 
to replicate and extend the original findings of Grey and Mathews (2000) and 
Mathews and Mackintosh (2000). The main aim of many CBM-I studies has been 
to examine the far-transfer effects of training – the ways in which inducing 
interpretive biases affects clinical outcomes, such as participants’ mood or 
emotional reactivity (Wilson et al., 2006 Beard & Amir, 2008; Mackintosh, 
Mathews, Yiend, Ridgeway & Cook, 2006; Salemink, van den Hout & Kindt, 2009). 
Typically far-transfer studies are concerned with how modified interpretive 
biases translate into changes in responses on emotional tasks that have little 
methodological overlap with the training task  (Hertel & Mathews, 2011). The 
main aims of a far-transfer approach in CBM-I research have been to reproduce 
the emotional biases seen in clinical populations in healthy people, and to test the 
effectiveness of training in alleviating symptoms associated with depression and 
anxiety.   
The results of far-transfer studies can potentially shed light on the role of 
interpretive biases in the onset and maintenance of psychopathology, which is 
characterized by biased cognitive processing. Findings further serve to inform 
treatment for these disorders by highlighting the protective or adverse effects of 
emotional interpretive biases on emotional reactivity. For example, studies that 
have administered CBM-I to anxious populations have found that positive or 
benign training alleviates self-reported symptoms of anxiety (e.g., Mathews & 
Mackintosh, 2000; Hirsch, Mathews & Clark, 2007; Vassilipoulis, Banerjee & 
Prantzalou, 2009). Alternatively, studies that have examined emotional reactivity 
following negative training have found complementary results. In one study, 
training showed no effect on anxiety assessed directly after the training phase 
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(Mackintosh, Mathews, Yiend, Ridgeway, & Cook, 2006). However, after viewing 
videos depicting accidents, participants who had received negative training 
reported elevations in anxiety and depression while those who had received 
benign training did not.  These findings are in line with the diathesis-stress 
model of mental health, which posits that cognitive biases are activated by 
stressful events (e.g., Beck, 1967; Hallion & Ruscio, 2011; Segal & Ingram, 1994). 
In this way CBM-I has been thought to affect an individual’s emotional reactivity 
during the presentation of a stressor but not necessarily affect anxiety or 
depression per se.  
Although there is clear evidence that CBM-I can alter emotional 
responding, much less research has focused on the near-transfer effects of 
training, namely the changes in interpretive processes themselves. Near-transfer 
effects inform us about the underlying mechanisms that support the emergence of 
an interpretation bias. Typically the benefits of investigating near-transfer effects 
have been overlooked, and little research has focused on identifying the 
functional aspects of a CBM-I training paradigm or on understanding exactly how 
CBM-I engenders a change in interpretive processes. By understanding how CBM-
I induces interpretive changes in near-transfer tasks, we could develop better 
training paradigms for the prevention and alleviation of symptoms associated 
with anxiety and depression. Furthermore, a better understanding of the 
mechanisms responsible for changes in emotional interpretation should 
strengthen our current psycholinguistic models of meaning selection and lead to 
a better understanding of the role of emotion in language comprehension more 
broadly. 
A Review of Common Training and Test Paradigms used in CBM-I Studies 
A number of approaches have been used in CBM-I studies to shift and then 
probe the presence of interpretive biases. The most common methodological 
approaches are compared and contrasted below. 
Training phases 
Training phases typically require participants to repeatedly disambiguate 
emotionally ambiguous material in either a consistently negative or benign 
manner. This can be done at either the scenario level, as used by Mathews and 
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Mackintosh (2000), or at the single word level, as used by Grey and Mathews 
(2000). In scenario-based training, participants typically read paragraphs 
describing an emotionally ambiguous situation that is resolved only by the 
completion of a final word fragment (e.g., Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000). 
Sometimes the sentence-final word is presented in complete form and 
participants simply need to read each scenario as it appears on the screen 
(passive reading tasks e.g., Hoppitt, Mathews, Yiend & Mackintosh, 2010b). A 
recent extension of scenario-based training is the inclusion of an imagery 
component during training, in which participants are instructed to create a 
mental image of the scenario as it unfolds (e.g., Holmes, Mathews, Dalgleish & 
Mackinstosh, 2006; Holmes, Lang & Shah, 2009; Holmes & Mathews, 2005; Nelis, 
Vanbrabant, Holmes & Raes, 2012).  Results from positive imagery-based CBM-I 
suggests that imagining the scenarios produces greater increases on measures of 
positive affect (a far-transfer task) versus simply focusing on the verbal 
descriptions (Holmes, Mathews, Dalgleish & Mackintosh, 2006). Scenario-based 
training paradigms have been found to modify interpretive biases using either 
paragraph or sentence length descriptions of ambiguous events (e.g., Amir & 
Taylor, 2012; Beard & Amir, 2008; Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000). 
In word-level training, participants view homographs (e.g., Terminal) and 
then are asked to make a response to a target word related to either its negative 
(e.g., Cancer) or benign (e.g., Airport) interpretation. Tasks include word 
fragment completion (in which the target is presented in incomplete form and 
the participant must type in their solution; e.g., Grey and Mathews, 2000), 
relatedness decisions (in which the participant must judge the relationship 
between the prime and the target, e.g., Hoppitt, Mathews, Yiend & Mackintosh, 
2010a) or lexical decisions (in which the participant must judge if the target is a 
word or a non-word e.g., Hoppitt et al., 2010b).  
Test Phases 
Following the training phase, a test phase is administered in order to 
assess the effect of training on interpretive biases. Test phases can be broadly 
categorised as either delayed or online tasks.  
Delayed tasks. Delayed tasks are commonly, though not exclusively, used 
with scenario training, and typically involve an interval between the presentation 
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of the ambiguous stimuli and the participant’s response. This means that the 
participant must think back to their original interpretation of the scenario and 
report it, rather than produce it immediately after the onset of the ambiguous 
stimuli.  
Recognition task. The recognition task is the most commonly used task in 
CBM-I studies to date. Developed by Mathews and Mackintosh (2002) this task 
involves a number of phases. After training, participants read ambiguous 
scenarios that may or may not involve solving a word fragment. The key here is 
that the scenario remains ambiguous. Then after a delay, participants are asked 
to rate the similarity of possible positive and negative interpretations of the 
critical scenarios in order to test whether an interpretive bias is present. 
Interpretive biases are reflected by greater endorsement of training-congruent 
interpretations of the critical scenarios. The underlying assumption is that 
participants will endorse the test sentence that most closely aligns with their 
original interpretation of the critical scenario.  
The recognition task reliably measures interpretive biases in a negative 
and benign direction (e.g., Mackintosh et al., 2006; Mathews, Ridgeway, Cook & 
Yiend, 2007). Beneficially, it tests the interpretation of highly descriptive 
ambiguous scenarios that describe realistic events, giving it some ecological 
validity. Furthermore, participants report not being aware of the purpose of this 
manipulation (Beard, 2011), attenuating the risk that demand characteristics 
drive task performance. 
The ambiguous social situation interpretation questionnaire. The 
ASSIQ is a 24-item questionnaire designed to measure participants’ 
interpretations of emotionally ambiguous events (Stopa & Clark, 2000). 
Participants read short scenarios describing a mix of ambiguous social (e.g., You 
go into a shop and the assistant ignores you) and non-social situations (e.g., A 
letter marked ‘urgent’ arrives). Following a prompt of ‘Why?’ participants write 
down the first reason they can think of for why this event has occurred. 
Participants then read three potential explanations for this event (one negative 
and two benign) and rank them in terms of how likely it is that they would have 
thought of this explanation.  This is considered a delayed task as participants are 
asked to compare the offered interpretations to their own original interpretation 
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of the event. The higher the ranking of the negative interpretation the more 
negative the interpretation bias score.  
Limitations of delayed tasks. Despite their frequent use in CBM-I 
paradigms, delayed tasks have some limitations that restrict their ability to 
directly assess interpretive biases or elucidate the cognitive processes that are 
recruited when participants make a response. Delayed tasks provide participants 
with a number of response options and do not place a limit on the time that a 
participant can view them or make a response. This means that a participant’s 
final response reflects a great number of cognitive processes over and above 
their immediate interpretation of ambiguous stimuli. Their response may index 
their initial interpretation of the scenario; but responses could also reflect 
changes in interpretation that occurred during encoding of the scenario, during 
its storage and consolidation during the delay, or during the retrieval process at 
test. Because emotional biases are also evident in memory and decision 
processes (Blanchette & Richards, 2010; Mathews, 2012; Salemink, Hertel, & 
Mackintosh, 2010; Tran, Hertel, & Joormann, 2011), a delayed similarity 
judgment cannot be taken as an indicator of interpretation per se. 
Secondly, delayed tasks may not assess a participant’s recollection of the 
critical scenario (and their interpretation of it), but their familiarity with the 
provided response options, which could be driven by the consistent use of one 
valence during the training phase.  That is, the repeated presentation of negative 
information during a negative training phase may increase the likelihood that a 
participant endorses a negative over a benign response option. In this way a 
participant is simply responding in a manner congruent with the valence of the 
training phase and their responses do not reflect their actual interpretation (or 
even memory) of the original scenarios (Harvey, Watkins, Mansell & Shafran, 
2004).  
Online tasks. An alternative test phase that has been used in CBM-I 
research is an ‘online’ task, which taps into a participant’s interpretation of 
ambiguous stimuli at the time of presentation. Online tasks require participants 
to make judgments about stimuli as they are presented, so as to index 
interpretation as (or shortly after) it occurs.  
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 The extrinsic affective simon task. The EAST is an online task that requires 
participants to learn associations between direction keys and the emotionality 
and colour of word stimuli (Salemink, van den Hout & Kindt, 2009). For example, 
participants may be taught to press the left key for a negative word and the right 
key for a benign word. They are also taught to press the left key for a blue word 
and the right key for a red word. Participants are therefore taught two response 
mappings for the left and right direction keys. Even when participants are told to 
focus only on the colour of the word, interference on response times to press a 
correct direction key can be observed depending on whether the stimuli are 
response congruent (e.g., a blue negative word) or response incongruent (e.g., a 
blue benign word). When a homograph is used in the colour judgement task, 
participants’ response times can reflect the interpretation a participant has 
made. For example, if the homograph Fall is presented in blue ink, participants 
who have interpreted it in a negative manner may respond faster than 
participants who have interpreted it in a benign manner (as blue requires a left 
key press whilst a benign word requires a right key press). The EAST has been 
considered an implicit measure of interpretation, because the participant is 
never required to interpret the homograph explicitly. 
 Scrambled sentences task. Participants are presented with a scrambled 
sentence made from six randomly ordered words. One negative and one benign 
phrase can be created by using just five of the words e.g., 
“apprehensive people with relaxed new I’m”. 
A cognitive load is also introduced (to minimize the ability to re-interpret) 
by asking participants to remember a six-digit number while generating the 
sentence. An interpretation bias is inferred if participants report significantly 
more sentences of a particular valence following training. Both negative and 
benign interpretive biases have been demonstrated in healthy and anxious 
populations following interpretation training (Bowler et. al., 2012; Standage, 
Ashwin & Fox, 2010).  
 Priming tasks. The most common online tasks use semantic priming to 
infer an emotional interpretive bias. In a typical (unambiguous) semantic 
priming task, a prime word is presented (e.g., Cat), followed by a target word to 
which the participant makes a response (e.g., lexical decision, naming, or judging 
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its relatedness to the prime). If the prime is related to the target (e.g., Dog), 
responses are facilitated (that is, they are faster and/or more accurate) relative 
to unrelated primes (e.g., Kayak). Priming is thought to occur through spreading 
activation from the meaning of the prime to the meaning of the target 
(Schvaneveldt & Meyer, 1973). When the prime word is an emotionally 
ambiguous homograph (e.g., Terminal) it can be related to both negative targets 
(e.g., Cancer) and benign targets (e.g., Airport). Participants use some 
combination of meaning frequency (or likelihood) and context to select a single 
meaning (e.g., Swinney, 1979; Simpson & Burgess, 1985). Participant’s responses 
should therefore be facilitated to targets that are consistent with their 
interpretation of the ambiguous prime. CBM-I uses this task to examine the 
influence of the training condition on the accessibility (or availability) of 
alternative meanings during the test phase. If training influences the relative 
availability of different meanings of an ambiguous word, then participants should 
show facilitation for judgments involving targets that are congruent with their 
training valence. Priming tasks in CBM-I typically show training effects (e.g., Grey 
and Mathews, 2000) whereby participants are faster to make responses to 
training-congruent than to training-incongruent meanings.  
Mixing Training and Test Phases. A potential concern with the tasks 
used in CBM-I research is the methodological overlap between training and test 
phases. Most scenario-based training uses a critical scenario recognition test 
phase and most word-based training phases are coupled with word-based online 
tasks.  
It is possible that, because the task demands of training and test are so 
similar, participants’ performance simply reflects the adoption of a task-specific 
strategy or task-related expertise rather than an actual change in interpretation 
processes (Saleminck, van den Hout & Kindt, 2010). One finding which speaks to 
this possibility is the failure to find interpretation change when using training 
and test tasks with less overlap. For example, interpretive biases have not been 
observed in the delayed ASSIQ or the online EAST (Extrinsic Affective Simon 
Task) tasks following Mathews and Mackintosh’s scenario-based training task 
(Salemink, van den Hout & Kindt, 2007; Salemink, van den Hout & Kindt, 2009).  
Overall, the interpretive biases that are observed following training may 
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be due to a change in the interpretation of emotional ambiguity. But alternatively 
they may reflect memory or decision biases at test caused by a delayed test 
phase, or enhanced performance on a particular task due to methodological 
overlap between training and test. Importantly, the choice of training and test 
procedures can limit the conclusions that can be drawn about the mechanisms 
that produce interpretive change.  
Ambiguity Resolution in Non-Emotional Contexts 
 CBM-I research has largely focused on the applications of this paradigm as a 
potential treatment for clinical disorders. As a result, previous research has, for 
the most part, not focused on the mechanisms of interpretation change, and has 
not always been informed by cognitive or psycholinguistic research on 
interpretation processes. This focus has led to the use of CBM-I paradigms that 
are not always well controlled against demand characteristics, and reliance on 
stimuli that may not be piloted or balanced on psycholinguistic variables that can 
themselves bias interpretation. Furthermore, methodological issues of 
procedural overlap have not been previously addressed. These factors are all 
critical if we are to understand the mechanisms by which we come to interpret 
an emotional event.  This is where a psycholinguistic and cognitive approach is 
relevant for CBM-I research. There is a strong tradition of psycholinguistic 
research on ambiguity resolution that can inform research methods and 
theoretical approaches for CBM-I studies. In this section, I discuss the current 
state of lexical ambiguity research and detail where this research may be useful 
in addressing some of the remaining questions around CBM-I.  
 Semantic network models are commonly used to describe the organisation 
of semantic information within the mental lexicon (e.g., Balota, 1994; Collins & 
Loftus, 1975; Kawamoto, 1993; Posner & Snyder, 1975; Seidenberg & MeClelland, 
1989). In a typical semantic network, words and their associated features and 
characteristics are assigned nodes within the semantic system. These nodes are 
connected in terms of their learned associations and the distance between each 
node reflects the strength of its association with that particular concept (e.g., 
Bird-Wings is more closely associated than Bat-Wings). The organisation of this 
information affects retrieval processes and in turn impacts response times 
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(Carroll & White, 1973). The semantic network theory is able to account for 
priming effects that are regularly seen in behavioural experiments such as the 
finding that concepts prime conceptually-related meanings. All nodes are 
assumed to have a resting level of activation that is enhanced when primed by a 
related concept. Therefore in a lexical decision task participants are faster to say 
“bird” is a word when preceded by the related prime “wings” than by the 
unrelated prime “nurse” (Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971; Neely, 1976, 1977)  
There are a number of steps involved in word recognition (for a review 
see Balota, Yap & Cortese, 2006; Frauenfelder & Komisarjevsky Tyler, 1984), 
which span the initial reception of a signal to final access to a semantic 
representation. When an information signal, such as a spoken or written word, is 
detected by the system a cascade of processes begins, starting with activation. 
Lexical (word-level) and semantic (conceptual level) information both contribute 
to the activation and subsequent selection of a single meaning for any given input 
signal. Activation is the process by which entries in the mental lexicon are 
matched for physical similarity with the lexical input; a number of lexical models 
suggest ways in which this may occur, (e.g. the cohort model, Marslen-Wilson, 
1987; the connectionist model, Seidenberg & McClelland, 1989; the logogen 
model, Morton, 1969; the autonomous search mode, Forster, 1976). Typically, 
the features of a word form are compared to a number of similarly formed 
representations stored within a ‘mental dictionary’. The number of competing 
words that are activated affects the speed with which a word is matched to its 
correct representation (Marslen-Wilson, 1987; Tyler, 1984). After appropriate 
entries have been activated, word recognition occurs when one entry (and its 
corresponding meaning) receives enough evidence in its favour that it is selected. 
Debate still exists regarding the specific mechanisms of recognition, for example 
on the number of intermediate processes involved (e.g., the existence of a 
‘lemma’ level, Caramazza, 1997), the timing with which the word form passes 
through lexical and semantic stages, the processes that are considered 
characteristic of different stages (e.g., pure orthographic activation in lexical 
access vs. orthographic effects combined with word frequency effects) or even 
whether these levels are independent or interactive. However, there is a general 
consensus across these models that the lexical and semantic levels constitute 
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different stages and that they are likely to be accessed in a systematic order. In 
this thesis I don’t distinguish between specific models, but experiments and 
predictions are driven by the basic two-stage process of meaning activation and 
meaning selection that are common to many models. 
Models of Meaning Sense Disambiguation  
The activation and selection of meanings within the mental lexicon is 
even more complex when the incoming signal has more than one possible 
interpretation. For a number of years there was a significant modularity debate 
within the semantic ambiguity literature regarding the relative independence of 
lexical activation and selection processes (Gorfein & Bubka, 1989; Simpson & 
Burgess, 1989, Simpson, 1994). The debate raised the question of whether 
activation of ambiguous word meanings could be affected by contextual effects, 
in order to guide the selection of an appropriate meaning. According to selective 
access accounts, activation and selection processes happened at the same time 
and therefore only the contextually appropriate meanings of an ambiguous word 
was activated (e.g., Schvaneveldt, Meyer, & Becker, 1976). Exhaustive access 
accounts on the other hand proposed that activation and selection represented 
different stages so that initial activation occurs for all meanings of an ambiguous 
word and selection is then driven by contextual information (Swinney, 1979; 
Tanenhaus, Leiman, & Seidenberg, 1979). Research to date shows support for a 
non-modular and context sensitive account of ambiguity resolution that falls 
somewhere between selective access and exhaustive access accounts (e.g., the 
Reordered Access Model, Duffy, Morris & Rayner, 1988). These models propose 
that factors such as meaning frequency and context interact in order to account 
for activation and selection patterns in meaning sense disambiguation. Selection 
must necessarily occur as more than one meaning of an ambiguous word will be 
activated; however, early activation patterns can be influenced to some extent by 
some contextual information.  
One contemporary model of semantic ambiguity resolution is the 
Independent Activation Model developed by Twilley and Dixon (2000). The model 
considers lexical and semantic levels of analysis to contribute independently and 
in parallel to the disambiguation of homographs.  In their account, Twilley and 
Dixon (2000) model activation from both an orthographic input (early lexical-
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level information such as form and frequency) and an integration input (late 
semantic-level information such as the surrounding sentential context and other 
sources of priming). From here selection occurs once activation for each meaning 
is summed and an appropriate word can be integrated into the surrounding 
context. The interpretation of ambiguity involves three broad stages from the 
onset of a stimulus to the final response of the participant.  First, its perceptual 
features are mapped onto stored lexical representations, activating all possible 
meaning candidates. Following this, contextual integration occurs via 
consideration of surrounding context and knowledge, resulting in selection of a 
single meaning. Finally, post-lexical processes - such as a participant’s 
reappraisal of their initial interpretation - occur before the participant reports 
their chosen meaning. Both the Reordered Access model and the Independent 
Activation model account for activation and selection patterns in meaning sense 
disambiguation and highlight the independent and parallel contributions a word 
receives from context and meaning frequency.  
The selection process. Homographs - written words that have more than 
one possible interpretation (e.g., Terminal) - are ideal stimuli to use in studies of 
ambiguous word recognition. They have the benefit that a number of factors such 
as length, pronunciation and orthographic form are held constant, while still 
allowing for access to two separate meanings. When a word has more than one 
possible meaning we rely on a number of factors to disambiguate it. One such 
factor is context – we select the meaning that best “fits” the sentence. Another 
factor is meaning frequency – we choose meanings that are more common and 
therefore more likely.  
 Context Effects. Context has been established as an important factor in 
ambiguous word meaning activation and selection (Binder & Morris, 1995; 
Onifer & Swinney, 1981; Simpson, 1984; Swinney, 1979; Tanenhaus et al., 1979; 
Schvaneveldt & Meyer, 1976).  Context acts at all levels of word recognition, from 
facilitation of perceptual recognition of lexical stimuli to the integration of an 
individual word into a wider sentential discourse (Masson & Borowsky, 1998). 
Context can also act as a source of information in either a local or a global 
manner. Local context refers to information that is presented in close proximity 
to the target word and can be manipulated trial-by-trial. The most well-known 
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example of a local context effects on word recognition is the semantic priming 
effect (e.g., Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971; Neely, 1976, 1977) in which primes 
facilitate responses to semantically related target words. This effect reflects 
automatic spreading activation to related concepts within the semantic network 
which speeds lexical access and word recognition for semantically related words.   
On the other hand, global context acts at a broader level and “sets the 
scene” by presenting information prior to the presentation of the target word 
(e.g., Kambe, Rayner & Duffy, 2001; Wiley & Rayner, 2000).  One study, using 
unambiguous words, manipulated global and local context in a study that 
represented natural discourse processing (Hess, Foss & Carroll, 1995). During 
the course of the experiment participants heard long passages and were required 
to name the final word in the sentence. In one condition the passage reflected a 
global context in support of the final word, yet the local context was unrelated to 
the target e.g.,  
 
The computer science major met a woman who he was very fond of. He had 
admired her for a while but was not sure how to express himself. He always got 
nervous when trying to express himself verbally so the computer science major 
wrote the poem. 
 
 In a second condition participants heard passages with a congruent local 
context prior to the target set in an incongruent global context e.g., 
 
The English major was taking a computer science class that she was 
struggling with. There was a big project that was due at the end of the semester 
which she had put off doing. Finally, last weekend the English major wrote the 
poem. 
 
 The facilitation of naming times was only observed when the target was 
related to the global context, regardless of whether the local context was 
congruent or incongruent with the target. In this way global context appears to 
build up a general conceptual representation  of the scenario at a semantic rather 
than a lexical level.  
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 In one of the earliest studies of the effects of global context on ambiguity 
resolution, Swinney (1979) examined the time course of meaning activation and 
selection from ambiguous words embedded in sentential contexts. Participants 
heard sentences containing a homophone (a spoken word with more than one 
possible interpretation) and performed a lexical decision to a visual word that 
was related to one of the meanings of the ambiguous word e.g.,  
 
Rumour had it that, for years, the government building had been plagued 
with problems. The man was not surprised when he found several spiders, roaches 
and other bugs in the corner of the room. 
 
Note that the sentence provides context for interpretation of the 
ambiguous word “bugs”. Following the onset of the homophone prime bugs, 
participants saw a related target word e.g., ant or spy, an unrelated word e.g., sew, 
or a non-word. The time between the onset of the homophone prime and the 
target (Stimulus Onset Asynchrony: SOA) was manipulated to determine when 
meanings became available and when they were selected. Regardless of whether 
the global context surrounding the word biased one particular meaning of the 
ambiguous word or was neutral, participants initially (within 250ms of stimulus 
onset) showed facilitated responses to targets associated with all possible 
meanings of an ambiguous word. However, after a delay (750-1000ms after 
stimulus onset) participants' responses were only facilitated for the contextually-
appropriate meaning (e.g., ant, which is consistent with the context provided by 
“spiders, roaches and other…”). Swinney’s (1979) findings are consistent with 
dual stage models of ambiguity resolution (e.g., Twilley & Dixon, 2000), which 
propose that when an ambiguous word is detected all possible meanings first 
become activated, and context then guides selection processes at a later stage.  
 Meaning Frequency Effects. Research conducted with ambiguous words 
presented in isolation shows that the initial activation of alternative meanings is 
driven by the relative frequency of each meaning. Following Swinney’s work, 
Simpson and Burgess (1985) examined how ambiguity resolution occurred in the 
absence of any context. In a semantic priming task, participants performed lexical 
decisions to targets related to the dominant and subordinate meanings of 
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ambiguous primes (e.g., Bank-Money or Bank–River). The SOA was manipulated 
in order to examine the time course of the availability of different meanings of 
the ambiguous prime. At a very short SOA (<300ms) only the dominant meaning 
of ambiguous words received any activation (i.e., lexical decisions were faster for 
Money than River. At a longer SOA (300ms) equivalent activation was observed 
for both dominant and subordinate meanings, in that participants were equally 
as fast to make lexical decisions to both types of word targets. However, at a 
much longer SOA (700ms), the activation of the dominant meaning was 
maintained whilst activation for the subordinate meaning decreased. After 
750ms no activation of the subordinate meaning was observed. These findings 
support the idea that meaning activation and selection in the absence of context 
occurs automatically in a manner dictated by meaning frequency (Twilley & 
Dixon, 2000). Much discussion has focused on the fate of the subordinate 
meaning, and at this time there is debate as to whether the reduction in 
activation of the subordinate meaning is due to decay, mutual inhibition from the 
dominant meaning or a different process altogether (see Gernsbacher, Varner, & 
Faust, 1990; Gernsbacher & St. John, 2001; MacLeod, Dodd, Sheard, Wilson, & 
Bibi, 2003; McNamara & McDaniel, 2004, Simpson, 1984 & Simpson & Kang, 
1994, for a detailed discussion regarding the controversies surrounding the 
concept of active suppression).  
 Automatic and controlled processing. Taken together, these findings 
suggest that the process of arriving at a single meaning is driven by an 
interaction between the relative dominance of meaning candidates (an 
“automatic” process) and the preceding context (a “controlled” process). In the 
literature we can see the evidence for two stages in ambiguity resolution, an 
early stage, in which all possible meanings of an ambiguous word become 
activated, and a later stage, in which context and frequency are used to settle 
upon one meaning and to reject all other meanings. This is in line with common 
models of ambiguous word recognition such as context-sensitive, exhaustive 
access accounts of lexical access (the Reordered Access Model; Duffy et al., 1988) 
and Twilley & Dixon’s (2000) Independent Activation Model. 
 Post-lexical processes. Following meaning selection, a participant still 
needs to make a response to the target. Processes that occur between selection 
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and response are broadly referred to as post-lexical processes. Post-lexical 
effects commonly occur at the response stage when a participant initiates an 
action in accordance with the task demands, e.g., pressing a button in a lexical 
decision task (Coulson & Federmeier, in press). A participant’s response can be 
affected post-lexically by the demands of the task in two ways. First, introducing 
a considerable delay between meaning selection and the required response 
allows decision processes to come into play. For example, a delay may give the 
participant time to reinterpret the ambiguous word or to report a meaning that is 
consistent with their expectations of the task’s purpose. This more “controlled” 
process of acting in accordance with expectations takes time. Therefore, without 
time pressure on a task (e.g., in homophone spelling tasks) a participant’s 
response may not reflect their initial interpretation of an ambiguous word, even 
in an “online” task. Post-lexical factors are an important consideration when 
developing a CBM-I paradigm.  
Second, even without a delay between stimulus presentation and 
response, the type of task that a participant is required to perform can affect the 
way in which they respond. This is particularly relevant in priming tasks. For 
example, in a naming task a participant is required to articulate the target word 
after the presentation of a prime word. While the prime can facilitate the speed 
with which participants name targets, success on the task does not rely on 
interpretation of the prime; participants need only access the phonemic 
sequence for the target, (which might or might not be influenced by its semantic 
representation). Alternatively, the use of a semantic judgment task, in which a 
participant must decide whether the target is conceptually related to the prime, 
forces the participant to read and interpret the meaning of each word in order to 
make a correct decision. Thus, after lexical access has occurred, the task that a 
person is required to perform can affect the cognitive processes that are 
recruited and the speed with which they proceed. For example, the semantic 
congruity of information preceding a word target (either at a sentence or a single 
word level) facilitates target lexical decision times but not target naming 
latencies (de Groot, 1984; West & Stanovich, 1984).  Therefore it is important to 
consider what task is used in a test phase especially when the interpretation of 
ambiguity is assessed.  
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Meaning Disambiguation in Emotional Contexts 
Sometimes, the ambiguity in a word is related to its emotional quality (i.e., 
words with one valenced and one benign interpretation). There are a number of 
ways emotion could influence interpretation processes. Psycholinguistic models 
of emotional word recognition suggest that words are stored in dynamic 
networks that reflect links between the word, its features and its emotional 
connotations (e.g., Bower, 1981;  Barsalou, 1999). It has also been suggested that 
emotional words may link to broader information structures such as emotion-
specific motor representations and physiological responses (e.g., Lang, 1994). 
Although all models propose the existence of lexical and semantic levels of 
processing, there is little consensus as to what characterises each level. 
Therefore there is no agreement on whether emotion can be considered a lexical 
or a semantic feature (or perhaps both; Palazova, 2014). In fact, effects of 
emotion can be observed at all stages of word recognition - from initial 
perceptual processing through to post-lexical stages (e.g., Kissler, Assadollahi & 
Herbert, 2006; Kissler & Herbert, 2013). Lexical access is faster for emotional 
compared to neutral words suggesting that valence and/or arousal facilitates the 
speed of early word activation (e.g., Kissler & Herbert, 2013). Furthermore, 
exposure to a prior emotional valence appears to aid the later integration of 
similarly valenced words, suggesting emotion works to guide the selection of 
meanings (e.g., Schact & Sommer, 2009). In this way emotion appears to broadly 
impact both lexical and semantic levels of word recognition.  
Meaning selection can be affected by emotional features that are inherent 
in the word form itself or by factors associated with the interpreter. Generally 
speaking, word form effects have been examined within psycholinguistic and 
cognitive psychology domains, whilst individual differences in emotional 
ambiguity resolution have been of more interest to applied clinical psychology 
researchers.  
One of the most well-studied effects of emotion on word recognition is the 
affective priming effect. Affective (or emotional) priming is observed when prior 
emotional context facilitates the processing of similarly valenced stimuli. In 
regards to lexical context, the presence of emotional words (e.g., Death) 
facilitates later processing of similarly valenced information (e.g., Aggressive) 
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compared to neutral words (e.g., Rose; Klauer, 2011). Emotional priming effects 
can be considered automatic in the sense that emotional priming is efficient, not 
dependent on processing resources (Hermans, Crombez, & Eelen, 2000), 
observed at relatively short SOAs (De Houer, Heermans & Eelen, 1998; Fazio, 
Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes 1986) and does not require awareness of the 
prime (Draine & Greenwald, 1998). In this sense, emotional priming behaves like 
a fast-acting but short-lived context, which facilitates responses to similarly 
valenced information in an efficient and non-discriminatory manner.  
Emotional experience can also bias the access of meanings in an emotion-
congruent manner. The mood-as-information theory proposes that the positive or 
negative feelings associated with emotions, mood states and physiological 
experiences act as sources of information which people use to interpret their 
surroundings (this is not assumed to be a conscious process; Schwarz & Clore, 
2011). While not a linguistic model, this theory is consistent with 
psycholinguistic research, which suggest that induced mood states can bias the 
interpretation of emotional ambiguity. People are faster to make interpretations 
of emotional ambiguity in a direction consistent with their own mood, suggesting 
that experienced mood states can serve as a source of bias in emotional 
interpretation (Clark, Teasdale, Broadbent & Martin, 1983; Challis & Krane, 1988; 
Halberstadt et al., 1995). 
In these two ways emotion appears to act as a prior context, which drives 
the activation and/or selection of one meaning from emotionally ambiguous 
information. This is in line with Bower’s Associative Semantic Network Model 
(1981) in which emotion is assigned a node in a semantic network just like any 
other piece of semantic information. In this model positive feedback loops occur 
between negative mood states and negative information processing (such as 
negative memories) that then serve to reinforce the mood state and enhance 
further activation of mood-congruent stimuli.  
Candidate Mechanisms 
It is possible to compare and contrast mechanistic explanations for 
modified interpretive biases by considering what is known about the processes 
involved in emotional ambiguity resolution. Two accounts have been raised that 
stand as real candidates for the effects underlying interpretive change - an 
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Emotional Priming Account and an Ambiguity Resolution Account. According to 
an Emotional Priming Account the activation of an emotional category during 
training increases the “ease” of activation or selection of meanings related to that 
particular emotional category, resulting in facilitated performance for similarly 
valenced information at a later stage (Grey & Mathews, 2000). This is believed to 
occur through a process similar to that of spreading activation seen in early 
semantic priming effects and proposed by semantic network models (e.g., Neely, 
1967). In an update to the conventional semantic priming model, Becker, 
Moscovitch, Behrmann and Joordens (1997) propose that the prior activation of 
a particular word meaning deepens an attractor basin. The activated basin 
increases its ‘pull’ and the probability that the same meaning will receive 
activation upon further presentations. The deepening of this basin also increases 
the spread of activation to conceptually similar meanings, therefore providing a 
benefit to meanings similar to the primed meaning. According to this account, the 
repeated resolution of ambiguity is not an important feature of the training 
phase; rather the repeated exposure to negative information is responsible for 
inducing a negative interpretive bias.  
Alternatively, according to an Ambiguity Resolution Account, training 
induces the use of an implicit production rule that biases selection towards 
emotionally congruent meanings under conditions of ambiguity. According to 
this view, the resolution of ambiguity is the critical feature of the training 
paradigm. A learned production rule is then developed over time, similar to 
learned production rules used in problem solving (e.g., IF there is ambiguity 
THEN select the ‘negative’/’benign’ meaning). In this case, the repeated 
presentation of a particular valence during training is not sufficient to shift an 
interpretation bias; rather, the process of disambiguation itself becomes biased, 
and therefore interpretive bias modification only occurs when the training 
requires ambiguity resolution.  
Based on current models of ambiguity resolution (Duffy et al., 1988; 
Twilley & Dixon, 2000), there are three processing stages at which training could 
alter interpretation. First, training may serve to bias the relative levels of early 
activation that each meaning receives, directly affecting the likelihood of 
selection of one meaning over another. In line with an Emotional Priming 
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Account, training may increase the activation of all words associated with the 
training valence, making the activation and selection of emotionally-congruent 
meanings more likely. Second, training may induce an implicit production rule, 
which directly contributes to meaning selection at a later stage. In this way 
training could act similarly to a procedural context; increasing the likelihood of 
selection of a particular valence in the presence of ambiguity (e.g., in the case of 
negative training, a participant may learn that an ambiguous context signals a 
subsequent negative interpretation). Finally, training may not directly affect the 
immediate interpretation of emotionally ambiguous stimuli at all. Instead the 
changes in measures of interpretation bias following training may reflect a 
number of other cognitive processes such as a participants’ reinterpretation of 
emotional ambiguity, emotional biases in memory, or their acting in accord with 
their awareness of the task’s purpose. Importantly, these accounts are not 
mutually exclusive – training could conceivably facilitate changes at any or all 
stages of meaning selection.    
Overview of the Thesis 
An important review by Blanchette and Richards (2010) addressed the 
effects of emotion on higher order cognitive processes. Of particular interest is 
their discussion of the mechanisms underlying interpretive biases. Their 
discussion raised two questions, namely 1) At what stage is interpretation 
affected by emotional context i.e., the activation, selection or (post-lexical) 
response stage and 2) what is the causal direction between interpretive biases 
and emotional effects such as state mood changes.  
CBM-I research has made important contributions to the second question 
- understanding the relationship between psychopathology and cognitive biases -  
by examining the directionality of their interactions and identifying mediating 
variables. However, little research has focused on elucidating the cognitive 
processes that are affected in lexical ambiguity resolution following CBM-I 
training (MacLeod, Koster, & Fox, 2009). Therefore, the overarching aim of this 
thesis is to identify and test possible mechanisms for the observed changes in 
interpretive biases following training. I focus on changes in interpretive biases in 
healthy populations in order to minimise individual differences associated with 
psychopathology that can also affect interpretation. 
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Chapter 2 describes the development and validation of a novel CBM-I task 
that remedies some of the limitations identified in previous research. An online 
task was used at test because of its advantages in minimising post-lexical effects, 
paired with a scenario-based training phase to minimise procedural overlap. A 
primed relatedness judgement task was used in the test phase in order to force 
selection of one meaning from an ambiguous prime. The experiment described in 
Chapter 3 tests an Emotional Priming Account of interpretive bias modification by 
determining whether training affects the activation of valenced meanings 
available at shorter SOAs. Chapter 4 describes two experiments is which the 
CBM-I task is systematically modified in order to address the Ambiguity 
Resolution Account; by manipulating the requirement for ambiguity resolution 
during the training phase. In Chapter 5 I use a primed lexical decision in the test 
phase to determine whether training effects generalise to a task that does not 
require active interpretation of the prime. Chapter 6 summarises the 
contribution of my research, integrates my findings with models of ambiguity 
resolution and emotional interpretation, and identifies implications for models of 
cognitive bias and future directions for CBM-I research.  
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Chapter 2: Developing and Validating an Interpretive Bias Modification 
Paradigm 
Three key methodological concerns were considered in the development 
of the paradigm used in this thesis. Firstly, criticisms have been levelled at CBM-I 
studies for the procedural overlap between training and test phases. Overlap 
makes it difficult to assess whether performance in the test phase is due to actual 
interpretation change, post-lexical processes, or participants’ developed 
expertise at a particular component of the task. Secondly, the delayed test phases 
commonly used in CBM-I tasks are limited in their ability to inform us about 
interpretive processes as they occur. It is quite possible that interpretation 
changes observed on delayed tasks reflect other mediating cognitive processes or 
response biases. Finally, stimuli used in training and test paradigms in the past 
have received little piloting to control for orthographic features known to impact 
lexical access and the selection of meanings. I therefore extensively piloted the 
stimuli that were ultimately selected for use in further studies. 
For these reasons, an ambiguous scenario training phase and a semantic 
priming task at test were selected. The training phase was modelled on previous 
scenario-based training phases, which reliably modify interpretive biases, with 
one key difference. In previous scenario-based training phases the word 
fragment is typically a sentence-final word and completion of the fragment 
constrains the interpretation of the scenario (e.g., Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000). 
This means that the training-appropriate interpretation of the scenario was 
provided for the participants when they completed the word fragment. In the 
current paradigm, word fragments were simply negative and benign words that 
were associated with possible interpretations a participant could make from the 
scenarios. In this way, participants were not required to interpret the scenarios 
in a specific way in order to correctly solve word fragments; however, efficient 
fragment completion should be facilitated by consistent interpretation of the 
scenarios. It was thought that such unconstrained (but guided) interpretation 
might encourage more active interpretation than the more passive task that is 
traditionally used when the experimenter provides the interpretation. 
Importantly, the training still contained the common features of scenario-based 
training including emotionally ambiguous scenes, semantically “rich” 
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descriptions of events, and valenced emotional word fragments. 
In the test phase a semantic priming task was selected. Priming tasks are 
most commonly used to assess the access of homograph meanings in language 
studies (Twilley & Dixon, 1999). Word recognition is most commonly studied 
with the classic semantic priming task (Neely, 1977). It is possible to manipulate 
many aspects of the priming task to identify factors that affect different stages of 
word recognition. For example it is possible to manipulate the duration of the 
prime, the delay between the prime and the target, and the task that the 
participant is required to perform (e.g., lexical decision or relatedness 
judgement). These manipulations can be used to determine the effects of training 
on specific interpretation processes, the time course of meaning activation and 
the effects of context on meaning selection.  
The priming task used to test interpretation in the first four experiments 
was a semantic relationship judgment adapted from Richards and French (1992). 
Participants saw emotionally ambiguous homograph primes (e.g., Terminal) 
followed after a short delay (750ms) by negative (e.g., Cancer) or benign (e.g., 
Airport) related targets or negative (e.g., Lonely) or benign (e.g., Table) unrelated 
targets. A sufficient delay after the presentation of the prime allows for both the 
activation and selection of its meaning before the onset of the target.  
Participants then judged whether the target was related or unrelated to the 
prime. The speed of this response provides an indication of the selected meaning 
of the prime. For example, if a participant selects the transportation-related 
meaning of Terminal, when the target word Airport is presented they will be 
faster to judge the prime and target as related compared to when the target word 
Cancer is presented. The relatedness task provides direct and online assessment 
of interpretive biases, and has considerably different task demands to the word 
fragment completion task in the training phase, minimizing procedural overlap 
between training and test. A relationship decision task was chosen over the more 
common lexical decision task in the first four experiments in order to force 
participants to interpret the prime word (Balota & Paul, 1996). However, a 
lexical decision task was used in Experiment 5 for comparison purposes.  
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Task Development 
Stimuli and Apparatus 
In all experiments, stimuli were presented using a Dell PC computer 
running Psychology Software Tools’ E-Prime Suite version 2.0 (Schneider, 
Eschman & Zuccolotto, 2002).  Stimuli were presented centrally on a 23-inch 
Alienware 2310 monitor with a vertical refresh rate of 60Hz.  Sentences and 
words were presented centrally with Calibri 18 pt font, in lower case black 
letters on a white background.  Participants were seated at a viewing distance of 
approximately 60 cm. All participants were testing individually in a private 
testing room unless otherwise noted. 
Training Phase 
During training, participants read emotionally ambiguous sentences 
followed by a related negative or benign fragment (depending on assigned 
training condition; See Figure 4.).  The sentences and words used during training 
were constructed and piloted to ensure the stimuli did not vary on basic 
orthographic properties as outlined below.   
 Sentences. Seventy-nine emotionally ambiguous, self-referential sentences 
were constructed that had one negative and one benign interpretation (e. g., The 
dog is running towards you; The boss wants to see you; See Appendix A for all 
training sentences.) The sentences were adapted from Mathews and Mackintosh 
(2000) and Mogg, Bradbury, and Bradley (2006), with additional sentences 
generated by our research team.  The sentences were piloted on nine people to 
remove badly constructed sentences and those that were strongly biased 
towards one particular interpretation. Pilot participants were asked to report the 
first three words that came into their mind after reading each sentence. Initial 
responses made to each sentence and the overall proportion of negative and 
neutral responses to each sentence were calculated. Sentences that consistently 
produced (over 65% of the time) negative or neutral associates were removed. 
This left 45 sentences for which pilot participants spontaneously generated both 
negative and benign associates. 
 Word Fragments.  In the training phase, each ambiguous sentence was 
followed by a word fragment to be completed. Fragments were consistently 
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related to either a negative or a benign interpretation of the sentence, depending 
on training condition. One negative and one neutral associate were selected from 
the most commonly produced responses generated during piloting of the test 
sentences. These critical words became the fragments used in training  
During CBM-I training, participants saw different fragments in the two 
training conditions. Therefore, it was important to ensure that the two groups of 
critical words (used to create the fragments) did not significantly differ on core 
orthographic features (See Table 1.). This ensured that any change in 
interpretation in the test phase could be attributed to the training condition, and 
not the specific word fragments that were used in each condition. Independent t-
tests revealed that the two sets of fragment words did not significantly differ in 
length, frequency, orthographic neighbourhood size or orthographic frequency 
(normative data collected from Wilson, 1988 and Medler & Binder, 2005).   
Table 1 
Mean orthographic properties of negative and neutral sentence associates.  
 Negative Targets Benign Targets 
 Mean SD Mean SD 
Length 6.89 2.12 6.91 1.96 
Frequency 95.13 55.33 62.73 76.23 
Orthographic Frequency 10.48 24.18 15.40 5.79 
Orthographic Neighbourhood 2.64 3.77 2.87 5.01 
 
Note: Orthographic Neighbourhood is the number of words (of the same length) 
that differ by only one letter. Frequency refers to how often a word is encountered 
per one million presentations of text (Kucera & Francis norms, 1967) 
 
Critical words need not necessarily be valenced themselves in order to be 
related to a valenced interpretation of the sentence, but they generally were. 
Valence ratings for the fragments were collected from a large corpus of affective 
norms (Warriner, Kuperman & Brysbaert, 2013) and independent samples t-
tests confirmed that critical words used as fragments in the negative training 
phase were significantly more negative (M = 2. 87, SD = 0. 86) than the benign 
fragments used in benign training (M = 6. 61, SD = 0. 187), t(86) = 16. 37, p <. 
 30 
001. Critical words were transformed into fragments by removing a consonant 
and a vowel from each word (only one letter was removed for the shorter word 
fragments). The word fragments were then piloted to ensure that fragments used 
in the negative and benign training conditions did not differ in completion 
difficulty.  
Seventeen pilot participants saw each training sentence once; half the 
sentences were paired with their negative word fragments and half with their 
benign word fragments.   Participants pressed the spacebar to indicate that they 
had solved the word fragment and then entered their response.  Ease of 
completion was operationalised as the time taken to press the spacebar after the 
onset of the word fragment for correct solutions.  Independent samples t-tests 
confirmed that there were no significant differences in time taken t(88) = 1.36, p 
= .18, or accuracy t(88) = 0.84, p = .48, in solving negative or benign word 
fragments (See Table 2.).  The average time taken to solve a word fragment was 
2121ms (SD = 813ms) and accuracy was 96.69% (SD = 10.31). 
Test Phase 
The test phase consisted of a semantic priming task in which emotionally 
ambiguous primes were paired with targets related to their negative or benign 
meanings (See Figure 4.).  Participants were required to make an explicit 
judgment about the semantic relationship between the prime and the target.  
 
Table 2 
Accuracy and time taken to complete word fragments as a function of target 
valence (Negative and Benign). 
 Negative Associates Benign Associates 
 Mean SD Mean SD 
Accuracy (%) 95.43 10.91 97.87 9.62 
Response Time (ms) 2363 2952 1943 2250 
 
 Homograph primes. For the test phase 143 homographs (e.g., patient) 
were collected which had one negative (e.g., hospital) and one benign meaning 
(e.g., calm). The homographs were balanced for meaning dominance based on a 
number of sources (Gawlick-Grendell & Woltz, 1994; Gee & Harris, 2010; Gorfein, 
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Viviani & Leddo, 1982; Twilley, Dixon, Taylor & Clark, 1994) and piloted on six 
participants in order to norm for modern meaning additions (e.g., the ambiguous 
word cell was removed from the corpus because of the additional modern 
interpretation of cellphone) and New Zealand colloquialisms. Pilot participants 
were presented with lists containing ambiguous and unambiguous words (to 
reduce the salience of ambiguity). They were asked to report the first three 
meanings that came to mind and a score was calculated for each word that 
reflected the proportion of responses produced for each meaning. Words that 
produced a consistent meaning (over two-thirds of the time) were discarded as 
unbalanced homographs. After exclusions, 52 balanced homographs remained 
that were used as primes.  
Associated targets. Homograph primes were paired with related 
negative and benign target words that were gathered from the University of 
South Florida Free Association Norms (Nelson, McEvoy, Walling & Wheeler, 
1980.). Five pilot participants generated associates to each ambiguous prime to 
ensure that they were similarly ambiguous for native speakers of modern New 
Zealand English.  Independent samples t-tests confirmed that negative and 
benign targets did not differ in length t(88) = 0.05,  p = .96 or word frequency 
t(88) = 1.18, p = .24.   Valence ratings were obtained from the affective norms 
database for each target (Warriner et al., 2013; Bradley & Lang, 1999).  Note that 
target words did not necessarily need to be valenced themselves to be related to 
the valenced meaning of an ambiguous word (e.g., fall – over) however 
independent t-tests confirmed that negative targets were rated as significantly 
more negative (M = 3.48, SD = 1.18) than benign targets (M = 6.39, SD = .98), t 
(102) = 13.63, p < .001. Homographs were also paired with one unrelated 
negative word and one unrelated benign word.  Unrelated targets were created 
by rematching existing targets with primes to produce pairs that were no longer 
associated. Two lists were constructed (See Appendix C) for the purposes of 
counterbalancing. Meaning dominance was counterbalanced across lists as 
equally as possible. Each list contained the homograph twice, once paired with a 
related target and once paired with an unrelated target. If the target in the 
related pair was negative then the target in the unrelated pair was benign and 
vice versa (see Table 3 for an example using the prime stalk). Independent t-tests 
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confirmed that there were no significant differences across lists in length, 
frequency, orthographic neighbourhood and orthographic frequency (the 
averaged frequency of the of the orthographic neighbours) target words (See 
Table 4).  
 
Table 3 
Typical allocation of primes and target valences across participants. 
 
Prime Relationship Valence Target 
Participant 1 stalk 
Related Negative Creep 
Unrelated Benign Kayak 
Participant 2 stalk 
Related Benign Flower 
Unrelated Negative Lonely 
  
 
Table 4 
Orthographic properties of targets for each counterbalanced list of homographs for 
the test phase. 
 List 1 List 2 
 Mean SD Mean SD 
Length 5.70 1.81 5.26 1.66 
Frequency 58.8 185.10 74.38 208.39 
Orthographic Frequency 4.42 4.12 5.48 5.70 
Orthographic Neighbourhood 37.61 151.65 53.27 175.67 
 
Note: Orthographic Neighbourhood is the number of words (of the same length) 
that differ by only one letter. Frequency and Orthographic Frequency refers to how 
often a word is encountered per one million presentations of text. 
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Figure 4. Novel CBM-I Procedure developed for Experiment 1.   
 
During training, participants were assigned to read 45 emotionally ambiguous 
scenarios paired with either all negative or all benign word fragments. During 
the test phase, participants saw 52 emotionally ambiguous prime-target pairs, 26 
targets were related to the benign meaning and 26 were related to the negative 
meaning. 
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Experiment 1a 
The purpose of Experiment 1a was to ensure that the novel training 
paradigm produced the expected interpretation bias as assessed with the 
semantic priming task. During training, participants read ambiguous sentences 
followed by negative or benign disambiguating word fragments. In the test phase, 
participants judged the relatedness of word pairs that consisted of an ambiguous 
prime followed by a target that was related to either the prime’s negative or 
benign meaning. The relatively long SOA (750 ms) allowed time for both 
activation and selection of the meaning of the prime to occur before the onset of 
the target (e.g., Neely, 1977; Swinney, 1979). If the CBM-I training phase 
effectively modifies an interpretation bias, then an interaction should be 
observed between training valence and target valence. Participants should be 
faster to judge negative interpretations of ambiguous words (e.g., Terminal - 
Cancer) as being related over benign interpretations (e.g., Terminal – Airport). 
The opposite pattern is predicted for benign training.  
Method 
Participants 
Based on a review of literature that used a similar training procedure, I 
determined an adequate sample size to be 32 participants per training condition. 
Seventy-one undergraduate students (29 men, 42 women; mean age: 19. 25 
years) participated for course credit.  All were native English speakers with 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision.  Participants reported no current or 
previous diagnoses of depression.  The study was approved by the Human Ethics 
Committee at Victoria University of Wellington.  All participants gave written 
informed consent prior to participation. 
Stimuli and Apparatus 
Training and test stimuli were those developed in the pilot stages. 
Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to receive either negative or benign 
training.  Training commenced with a centrally presented sentence (e. g., The 
boss wants to see you) and was followed, after a self-paced key press, by a 
negative or benign word fragment (e. g. , f_red [fired] or pr_moted [promoted]).  
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When participants had solved the word fragment they pressed the spacebar and 
then typed the answer in full.  Participants completed three practice trials before 
completing 45 training sentences.  During the test phase, all participants 
completed the same semantic priming task to assess the presence of an 
interpretation bias.  An ambiguous prime was presented centrally on the screen 
(e. g., shoot) for 250ms followed by a target that was either related (e. g., gun or 
bamboo) or unrelated (e. g. , lonely or canoe) to the negative or benign meaning of 
the prime.  The time between the onset of the prime and the onset of the target 
(stimulus onset asynchrony; SOA) was 750ms.  Participants indicated whether 
the target was related or unrelated to the prime by pressing the 1 or 2 key on the 
number pad of the keyboard.  Participants responded to 104 trials presented in 
random order; 52 targets were related to the prime (26 negative targets and 26 
benign targets in each relatedness condition) and 52 were unrelated.  The target 
remained on screen for 2000ms, or until the participant made a response, and 
was followed by an inter-trial interval of 1000ms.  The between-subjects variable 
was training condition (negative or benign), and the within-subjects variables 
were target valence (negative or benign) and target relationship (related or 
unrelated).   
Results  
The mean time taken to correctly complete word fragments during the 
training phase was 2661ms and the overall accuracy was 94%. The time taken to 
complete word fragments did not vary as a function of training condition t(64) = 
.412, p = 0.68. Results focus on performance in the test phase as a function of 
training valence condition.  
Accuracy and median response times for correct trials were calculated for 
each condition (see Table 5).  
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Table 5 
Mean Response Times and Accuracy of Subjects’ Responses to Targets as a Function 
of Training for Experiment 1a (with Standard Deviations in Parentheses) 
 Related Target Valence Unrelated Target Valence 
Training Valence Negative Benign Negative Benign 
 Response Times (ms) 
 
Negative 
 
919 (180) 
 
961(150) 
 
1117(268) 
 
990(322) 
 
Benign 
 
943(199) 
 
902 (174) 
 
1021 (240) 
 
933(230) 
 Accuracy 
 
Negative 
 
0.83 (0.12) 
 
0.84 (0.11) 
 
0.84 (0.18) 
 
0.90 (0.12) 
 
Benign 
 
0.78 (0.14) 
 
0.82 (0.11) 
 
0.88 (0.11) 
 
0.93 (0.09) 
 
Response times shorter than 250ms were excluded from analyses as 
anticipatory. Although response times for unrelated trials are reported (see 
Table 5), the primary analyses focused on the effects of training on judgments of 
“related” word pairs.  
Semantic priming studies using a lexical decision task often calculate a 
priming measure (the response time advantage for related over unrelated trials); 
however, such a measure is inappropriate to use with a relatedness task, because 
the related judgement “yes” differs in many ways from the unrelated judgement 
“no”2. A relatedness judgement is essentially a signal detection task, so in 
addition to response time and accuracy, performance was transformed into a 
sensitivity (d’) measure to indicate participants’ ability to discriminate between 
related and unrelated targets. This measure was used to identify outliers with 
                                                        
2 I will use a lexical decision task in Experiment 5 to examine priming in more 
depth. 
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poor discrimination. A ‘hit’ was defined as a correct “related” response to a 
related target and a ‘false alarm’ was defined as giving an incorrect “related” 
response to an unrelated target. Sensitivity was calculated according to the 
formula: 
d’ = z (Hit Rate) – z (False Alarm Rate) 
Higher scores indicate a greater ability to discriminate between related 
and unrelated targets. Two sensitivity scores were calculated for each 
participant; their d’ scores to negative and benign related prime-target pairs. A 
criterion for participant inclusion was established so that any participant with a 
d’ score of greater than one in at least one target condition (negative or benign) 
was included. This criterion led primarily to the elimination of participants who 
tended to call every prime-target pair related. Five participants were removed 
from the analysis because their d’ values were less than 1.0 in at least one 
condition. There were 33 participants remaining in each training condition. 
Interpretation bias is indicated by an interaction between training and target 
valence such that responses are facilitated for training-congruent target valences.  
Response Times  
Median Response times (RTs) to related targets were analysed in a 2 
(Training: negative vs. benign) x 2 (Target Valence: negative vs. benign) mixed 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) with Training as a between-subject variable and 
Target Valence as a within-subject variable. A significant Training by Target 
Valence interaction was observed F(1, 64) = 6.79, p = .01,  𝜂𝑝
2 = .09 (see Figure 5). 
Paired-samples t-tests revealed that participants in the Benign Training 
condition showed a marginal benign bias; they were faster to judge benign 
associates as related to the ambiguous homographs (M = 902ms, SD  = 174) than 
negative associates (M = 943ms, SD  =199), t(33) = -1.67, p = .10 d = -0.22 . In 
contrast, participants in the Negative Training condition showed a negative bias; 
they were significantly faster to judge negative associates as related to the 
ambiguous homographs (M = 919ms, SD  = 180) than benign associates (M = 
961ms, SD  = 150), t(33) = 2.06, p = .04 d = .25.  This Training x Target Valence 
interaction indicates successful induction of an interpretation bias.  
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Figure 5. Response times (ms) to negative and benign targets as a function of 
training valence for Experiment 1a. Errors bars are Standard Errors. 
 
Accuracy 
Accuracy was calculated as the proportion of correct responses made to 
negative and benign related targets (i.e., Hits). Accuracy was analysed similarly to 
RT in a 2 (Training: negative vs. benign) x 2 (Target Valence: negative vs. benign) 
mixed ANOVA. The Training x Target Valence interaction was not significant, F(1, 
64) = 2.59, p = .11,  𝜂𝑝
2  = .04, however the pattern of results mirrored that in the 
RT analyses (See Table 5). A main effect of Target Valence approached 
significance, in that participants were more accurate in judging relatedness 
between ambiguous primes and their benign interpretations as opposed to their 
negative interpretations F(1, 64) = 3.03, p = .08,   𝜂𝑝
2  = .04. Similar effects were 
observed in d’. Median d’ scores were analysed similarly to RT in a 2 (Training: 
negative vs. benign) x 2 (Target Valence: negative vs. benign) mixed ANOVA.  
There was a main effect of valence, F(1, 64) = 19.76, p < .001,  𝜂𝑝
2  = .02, 
participants were better able to discriminate between related and unrelated 
words when the target was benign (M = 2.58, SD = .87) than when the target was 
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negative (M = 2.2, SD = .70). No other significant effects were observed.  
Experiment 1b 
 In order to determine the reliability of the effects seen in Experiment 1a, a 
direct replication was run with a new group of participants.  
Method 
Participants 
60 undergraduate students (15 men, 45 women; mean age: 21.34 years) 
participated for course credit. All were native English speakers with normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision.  Participants reported no current or previous 
diagnoses of depression.  The study was approved by the Human Ethics 
Committee at Victoria University of Wellington.  All participants gave written 
informed consent prior to participation. 
Stimuli and Apparatus 
Stimuli and Apparatus were identical to that of Experiment 1.  
Procedure 
Participants were run in groups of four, at individual testing carols. The 
procedure was otherwise identical to that of Experiment 1. 
Results  
The mean time taken to correctly complete word fragments during the 
training phase was 2036ms and the overall accuracy was 94%. Response times to 
complete word fragments did not differ by training condition t(52) = 1.46, p = 
0.15.  Accuracy and mean response times for correct trials were calculated for 
each condition (see Table 6). Six participants were removed from the analysis 
because their d’ values were less than 1.0 in at least one condition.  There were 
27 participants remaining in each training condition.  
Response Times 
Response times (RTs) to related targets were analysed in a 2 (Training: 
negative vs. benign) x 2 (Target Valence: negative vs. benign) mixed analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) with Training as a between-subject variable and Target 
Valence as a within-subject variable. A significant Training by Target Valence 
interaction was observed F(1, 52) = 5.34, p = .02, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .09 (see Figure 6). Paired-
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samples t-tests revealed that participants in the Benign Training condition were 
significantly faster to judge benign associates of ambiguous primes as related 
than negative associates, t(26) = 2.57, p = .02, d = .19. Participants in the Negative 
Training condition showed a trend in the opposite direction; they were 
marginally faster to judge negative associates as related than benign associates 
t(26) = -1.16, p = .20, = .21 . This Training x Target Valence interaction is very 
similar to that seen in Experiment 1, and indicates successful induction of an 
interpretation bias 
Accuracy 
Accuracy was calculated as the proportion of correct responses made to negative 
and benign related targets. Accuracy was analysed similarly to RT in a 2 
(Training: negative vs. benign) x 2 (Target Valence: negative vs. benign) mixed 
ANOVA. No significant effects were observed. 
Table 6 
Mean Response Times and Accuracy of Subjects’ Responses to Targets as a Function 
of Training for Experiment 1b (with Standard Deviations in Parentheses)  
 Related Target Valence Unrelated Target Valence 
Training Valence Negative Benign Negative Benign 
 Response Times (ms) 
 
Negative 
 
848 (115) 
 
872(130) 
 
959(207) 
 
891(173) 
 
Benign 
 
841(115) 
 
809 (99) 
 
904 (164) 
 
891(170) 
 Accuracy 
 
Negative 
 
0.75 (0.12) 
 
0.75 (0.12) 
 
0.86 (0.12) 
 
0.92 (0.08) 
 
Benign 
 
0.78(0.12) 
 
0.78 (0.11) 
 
0.86 (0.18) 
 
0.92 (0.16) 
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Median d’ scores were analysed similarly to RT in a 2 (Training: negative 
vs. benign) x 2 (Target Valence: negative vs. benign) mixed ANOVA.  There was a 
main effect of valence, F(1, 52) = 11.61, p < .001,  𝜂𝑝
2  = .18, participants were 
better able to discriminate between related and unrelated words when that 
target was benign (M = 2.46, SD = .72) than when the target was negative (M = 
2.07, SD = .66). No other significant effects were observed.  
 
Figure 6. Response times (ms) to negative and benign targets as a function of 
training valence for Experiment 1b. 
   
General Discussion 
The results of Experiment 1a reveal the successful induction of an 
interpretive bias following a novel scenario-based training phase. After benign 
training, participants were faster to respond to targets related to benign 
meanings of ambiguous words relative to negative meanings. However, after 
negative training, participants were instead faster to make relatedness decisions 
to negative associates. The results of Experiment 1b replicate the findings of 
Experiment 1a, bolstering the evidence that the novel CBM-I paradigm 
successfully modifies interpretative bias. 
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It is unsurprising that the interaction between training and target valence 
was not significant in the accuracy data. In many priming tasks accuracy is 
typically quite high and as a result, the speed at which participants make 
responses is a better measure of the availability of meanings instead. Despite 
this, a clear trend towards an interaction between training valence and target 
valence was evident in Experiment 1a, and the data show no indication of a 
speed-accuracy trade-off.  
The training procedure differed slightly from the traditional scenario-
based training paradigm, in which the word fragment is typically the last word of 
the sentence or scenario and so ultimately constrains the emotional 
interpretation. In this paradigm, the sentence itself remained ambiguous, but the 
fragment was consistently related to either its negative or benign interpretation. 
Despite procedural differences, training produced a typical interpretation bias in 
both experiments, as indicated by the Training x Target Valence interaction in 
response times. Moreover, the effect size for the critical interaction (𝜂𝑝
2 = .09 in 
both Experiment 1a and 1b) was similar to that reported in other studies that use 
semantic priming tasks to assess interpretation (e.g., Hoppitt et al., 2010a, 𝜂𝑝
2  = 
.12).  
By using an online priming task I was able to assess the interpretation of 
emotional ambiguity almost immediately (750 ms) after the presentation of an 
ambiguous word. This online task contrasts with delayed tasks such as a 
recognition memory task that can reflect biases introduced by reinterpretation in 
memory or decision-making processes. The systematic piloting and construction 
of balanced stimuli lists also makes it unlikely that these biases are due to 
differences in the orthographic properties of the stimuli. The results of 
Experiment 1a and 1b give considerable weight to the argument that the training 
phase directly affects participants’ later interpretation of emotional ambiguity in 
the test phase. 
Another consideration is the overall benign bias seen in related target RT 
performance. One explanation for the benign bias could be  that judging whether 
two benign words are related is simply an easier decision than judging the 
relationship between two negative words. Negative valence may reflect a 
stronger (or more coherent) semantic category than benign valence, meaning 
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that all negative words seem more likely to be related due to their shared 
emotional category.  With this emotional connection in mind it may be more 
difficult to reject Punch-Coward as a related pair than Desert-Bacon. Without a 
no-training control condition it is impossible to determine whether participants 
in the benign training condition show facilitation for benign targets relative to 
participants who have not gone through any training. A no-training control 
condition is rarely used in CBM-I experiments (Hirsch, Hayes & Mathews, 2009; 
Mobini et al., 2014) and so a conservative conclusion is that, relative to benign 
training, negative training causes a shift in meaning selection. An alternative 
explanation for the benign bias is that it may reflect a failure to properly balance 
stimuli for meaning dominance (despite all efforts during piloting), but it may 
also reflect a positivity bias.  
Finally, the findings of Experiment 1a and Experiment 1b bolster the 
suggestion that an interpretive bias has been modified following the novel 
scenario-based CBM-I paradigm.  
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Chapter 3: Investigating the Time-Course of Interpretive Bias Modification 
The results of Chapter 2 suggest that the novel CBM-I paradigm used in 
Experiments 1a and 1b shifted interpretive biases in healthy participants. A 
further question that now arises concerns the emergence of such biases. How do 
interpretive biases unfold over time? At what lexical stages, (i.e., activation or 
selection) can they be observed? According to the widely accepted two-stage 
models of lexical ambiguity resolution (e.g., The Reordered Access Model: Duffy et 
al. 1988 and The Independent Activation Model; Twilley & Dixon, 2000), biases in 
meaning availability could appear as early as the stage at which each meaning is 
activated. Alternatively, differences may not emerge until a later stage when 
meaning selection occurs. 
The two mechanistic accounts of interpretive bias make different 
predictions about how these differences may arise following training. According 
to an Emotional Priming Account, training serves as a global emotional context, 
which influences the availability of all emotionally-congruent meanings. 
Emotional priming accounts therefore predict that training effects could appear 
either at an early meaning activation stage or a later selection stage. 
Alternatively, according to an Ambiguity Resolution Account the training phase 
fosters the acquisition of a learned production rule, which affects the later 
selection of one meaning of an ambiguous word. Therefore, training should only 
have an effect at the later selection stage, and not at the earlier activation stage.  
One way to observe changes in lexical processing over time is to 
manipulate the Stimulus Onset Asynchrony (SOA), the time between the 
presentation of a prime and a target. A participant’s response reflects the 
influence of the prime on the processing of the target at the moment it appears. 
At short SOAs (i.e., under 300 ms), all possible meanings of the prime will have 
been activated, but not selected, when the target appears. At long SOAs, the 
meaning of the prime will have been both activated and selected. A number of 
studies using variable SOAs have shed light on the changing pattern of activation 
in semantic memory at different intervals (e.g., Swinney, 1979, Tanenhaus, 
Leiman & Seidenberg, 1979, Simpson & Burgess, 1985). Importantly, context can 
have different effects at different stages of meaning selection. 
Early lexical access is believed to be fast and automatic and later strategic 
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processes are thought to be driven by contextual effects (e.g., Posner & Snyder, 
1975; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). Early automatic effects of semantic priming 
have been well-documented. For example, Neely (1977) examined the effects of 
expectancy and semantic relatedness in a lexical decision task with variable 
SOAs. Participants were told to expect targets related to “building” concepts (e.g., 
window, door) to always follow primes related to body concepts (e.g., leg-
window). However, sometimes prime-target pairs, which were not expected but 
were semantically related appeared (e.g., door-window). Prior to 450ms, only 
lexical decisions to targets that were semantically related to the primes were 
facilitated. However, after 2 seconds, only lexical decisions to expected 
relationships were facilitated and not those to semantically associated targets. It 
therefore appears that intentional processing of the prime-target relationship 
does not emerge in the early stages of lexical access. The next question is then, 
how does emotion fit with these findings? Does the emotional context established 
by the training phase act similarly to established semantic relationships and 
drive the automatic activation of meanings, similar to the affective priming 
effect? Or do the effects of the training phase only emerge later, to guide strategic 
selection of an appropriate meaning? 
Effects of emotion on unambiguous word recognition have been observed 
at short SOAs in a number of priming studies (Spruyt, Hermans, De Houwer, 
Vandromme & Eelen, 2007; Hermans et al., 2001). For example, Klauer, Robnagel 
and Musch (1997) presented participants with prime-target pairs consisting of 
negative or positive word combinations and participants judged if the second 
word was positive or negative. At a short SOA (100ms) participants showed 
facilitated performance for congruent relative to incongruently valenced word 
pairs. This suggests the existence of a very early affective priming effect, resulting 
from boosted activation of similarly valenced words. Prior exposure to an 
emotional context may therefore speed activation to emotionally-congruent 
meanings of an emotionally ambiguous prime. This activation may only last long 
enough to affect lexical access but not selection, which occurs after 500ms. No 
priming was observed at the longer SOA’s, which the authors took to mean that 
evaluative priming effects are short-lived and decay quickly when alternative 
strategic processes are not recruited.  
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Broader (non-emotional) contextual effects in priming studies are not 
observed until later processing stages. For example studies using ambiguous 
primes (e.g., bugs) embedded in a sentence, have found that upon initial 
presentation of the prime, priming occurs for both meanings (e.g., ant and spy) 
however, after a delay priming is only observed for the contextually appropriate 
meaning (e.g., Swinney, 1979).  This is in line with the theorized timing of 
strategic processes that integrate the word into the broader sentence context 
following activation of meaning candidates. In regards to emotional context, 
Richard and French (1992) found that lexical decisions to threatening 
interpretations of ambiguous words were facilitated for high anxious 
participants after 750ms but not at a 500ms SOA.   This suggests that in anxious 
populations, mood congruent biases for meanings of ambiguous words appear 
around the same time that sentential context is integrated into the selection of 
meanings (Swinney, 1979).  Other studies that have looked at the emotional 
priming effect at long SOAs suggest that these slower-acting context effects 
reflect “controlled” strategic processes (e.g., de Groot, 1984; Neely, 1991; 
Seidenberg, 1985).  The effects of emotional context on early and late processing 
stages can be described as reflecting local and global context, respectively. Local 
context effects seen in affective priming tasks result in fast and early activation of 
congruent meanings, whilst global context reflects the slower effect of contextual 
integration with a broader context or discourse at a later selection stage.  
Experiment 1a and 1b used a relatively long SOA (750 ms), which allowed 
time for both activation and selection of the meaning of the prime to occur before 
the onset of the target (e. g., Neely, 1977; Swinney, 1979). By presenting the 
target earlier (i.e., by using a shorter SOA) it is possible to tap into the earlier 
activation stage of lexical processing, before a participant has selected a 
particular meaning of the ambiguous prime word. If training biases the activation 
levels of valenced meanings of an ambiguous prime, then training effects should 
be observed at both the short and long SOA. However, if training only biases the 
selection of meanings, then training effects should only be apparent in the long 
SOA condition (i.e., Experiment 1a and 1b). The idea of biased selection is in line 
with models of ambiguity resolution (e.g., Duffy et al., 1988, Twilley & Dixon, 
2000), which state that meaning activation cannot be constrained in such a way 
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that only one meaning becomes activated. However, the amount of activation 
each meaning receives can be modified by contextual and frequency variables 
(e.g., Oden & Spira, 1983; Simpson & Burgess, 1985). Importantly, according to 
an Ambiguity Resolution Account, interpretive biases should only emerge at a long 
SOA due to the induction of a production rule that requires the recruitment of 
strategic processing, and should therefore not be observed at a shorter SOA 
However, according to an Emotional Priming Account, which states that an 
interpretive bias reflects a broad activation of training-congruent emotional 
networks, an interpretive bias might appear at either a short or a long SOA.  
Experiment 2  
Participants 
74 undergraduate students (26 men, 48 women; mean age: 19.68 years) 
participated for course credit. All were native English speakers with normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision.  Participants reported no current or previous 
diagnoses of depression.  The study was approved by the Human Ethics 
Committee, Victoria University of Wellington.  All participants gave written 
informed consent prior to participation. 
Stimuli and Apparatus 
Stimuli and Apparatus were identical to that of Experiment 1.  
Procedure 
The training phase was identical to that of Experiment 1. In the test phase, 
the time between the presentation of the prime and the target (SOA) was 
shortened to 250ms. Participants were run in groups of four. 
Results 
The mean time taken to correctly complete word fragments during the 
training phase was 2136ms and the overall accuracy was 95%. Time taken to 
complete word fragments did not differ by training condition t(67) = .658, p = 
0.51. Results focus on performance in the test phase as a function of training. 
Accuracy and mean response times for correct trials were calculated for each 
condition (see Table 7). Five participants were removed from the analysis 
because their d’ values were less than 1.0 in at least one condition.  There were 
35 participants in the Negative Training Condition and 34 in the Benign Training 
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Condition.  
Table 7 
Mean Response Times (ms) and Accuracy of Subjects’ Responses to Targets as a 
Function of Training for Experiment 2(with Standard Deviations in Parentheses) 
 
 Related Target Valence Unrelated Target Valence 
Training Valence Negative Benign Negative Benign 
 Response Times (ms) 
Negative 839 (150) 832 (128) 937(168) 859(152) 
Benign 843(152) 799(133) 931(184) 889 (138) 
 Accuracy 
 
Negative 
 
0.76 (0.11) 
 
0.78 (0.10) 
 
0.88 (0.10) 
 
0.91 (0.09) 
 
Benign 
 
0.75(0.12) 
 
0.82 (0.11) 
 
0.90 (0.09) 
 
0.94 (0.05) 
 
Response Times  
Response times (RTs) to related targets were analysed in a 2 (Training: 
negative vs. benign) x 2 (Target Valence: negative vs. benign) mixed analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) with Training as a between-subject variable and Target 
Valence as a within-subject variable. The interaction did not approach 
significance, F(1, 67) = .04, p = .84,  𝜂𝑝
2  = .01, indicating that participants did not 
differ in their speed of relatedness judgments as a function of training. This 
finding indicates a failure to modify interpretive biases in participants. A main 
effect of valence was found whereby participants were faster to identify benign 
associates of ambiguous primes (M = 816ms, SD = 132) as related than negative 
associates (M = 841ms, SD = 150), F(1, 67) = 33.05, p < .001,   𝜂𝑝
2 = .33. No other 
significant effects were observed. 
Accuracy 
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Accuracy was calculated as the proportion of correct responses made to 
negative and benign related targets (i.e., hits). Accuracy was analysed similarly to 
RT in a 2 (Training: negative vs. benign) x 2 (Target Valence: negative vs. benign) 
mixed ANOVA. A main effect of valence was found whereby participants were 
more accurate at judging the relationship between benign associates of 
ambiguous primes (M = .80, SD = .10) than negative associates (M = .76, SD = .11), 
F(1, 67) = 7.40, p = .008,   𝜂𝑝
2 = .10. Median d’ scores were analysed similarly to RT 
in a 2 (Training: negative vs. benign) x 2 (Target Valence: negative vs. benign) 
mixed ANOVA.  There was a main effect of valence, F(1, 67) = 23.7, p < .001,  𝜂𝑝
2  = 
.26, participants were better able to discriminate between related and unrelated 
words when the target was benign (M = 2.54, SD = .62) than when the target was 
negative (M = 2.16, SD = .57). No other significant effects were observed.  
General Discussion 
The results of Experiment 2 reflect a failure to find any modification of 
interpretation bias following training when the SOA in the test phase was 
shortened to 250ms. During the test phase, participants were neither faster nor 
more accurate to respond to negative or benign targets as a function of training. 
These findings suggest that the interpretive biases observed in Experiments 1a 
and 1b emerge by 750ms but not after 250ms.  The training appears to act as a 
contextual cue that guides the selection of a training-congruent meaning 
There was a general advantage for benign over negative meanings in both 
accuracy and RT. The bias towards benign meanings at the short SOA in this 
experiment is similar to that seen in the benign training condition at the long SOA 
(59ms advantage in 1a, 63ms advantage in 1b and 25 ms here). The stable benign 
bias seen across experiments may either reflect a stable benign bias 
characteristic of healthy populations or it may suggest that the benign 
relationship decision is simply an easier one relative to negative relationship 
decisions. 
Overall, the results suggest that the effects of training only emerge at a 
later selection stage following the activation of multiple meaning candidates. The 
non-significant interaction between training and target valence at a short SOA 
this argues against an early affective priming effect. However, the question 
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remains whether interpretation change at the meaning selection stage arises 
through emotional priming or through an implicit production rule, or both. 
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Chapter 4: The role of ambiguity resolution in training 
Experiments in Chapter 2 established that the scenario-based training 
paradigm altered interpretive biases in the test phase, and findings from Chapter 
3 indicated that training altered the later meaning selection, and not the earlier 
activation stage of processing. But how does training affect meaning selection? 
Both Emotional Priming and Ambiguity Resolution Accounts can explain the 
effects of training on meaning selection, but they do so through different 
mechanisms.  According to an Emotional Priming Account, repeatedly accessing 
valenced information during training facilitates later selection of similarly 
valenced information. Late-acting emotional priming effects are proposed to 
occur via priming throughout an attractor network (Becker et al.,, 1997).  
Alternatively, according to an Ambiguity Resolution Account, the training 
phase provides procedural context whereby participants learn a given response 
in the presence of emotional ambiguity. A participant learns an implicit 
production rule over the course of the experiment; to select one meaning over 
another in a possible ‘IF in the presence of emotional ambiguity THEN select a 
negative interpretation” manner. One possible explanation for the acquisition 
and application of procedural rules can be surmised from the implicit knowledge 
literature (e.g., Lewiki, Hill & Bizot, 1988). This approach is developed from 
evidence that the cognitive system can implicitly detect complex relationships 
between different features of stimuli. After acquisition, the procedural rule can 
then be applied and generalized to encounters with novel stimuli. Similar 
procedural rules have been successfully induced in participants in other contexts 
(Hill, Lewicki, Czyzewska & Boss, 1989). In an initial learning phase participants 
saw six short videos of men and women completing mundane activities, dubbed 
over with a spoken negative or benign internal monologue. The negative 
monologues described a person’s hidden sadness or anxiety while the benign 
monologues detailed routines of college life. Gender was manipulated so that half 
of participants heard the woman’s monologue, and half heard the man’s 
monologue. Afterwards, participants were presented with a list of personality 
and mood dimensions (e.g., Optimistic-Pessimistic, Sad-Happy) and were asked 
to rate male and female acquaintances on each characteristic. Participants in the 
sad male monologue condition rated their male acquaintances as being more sad 
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than their female acquaintances. Similar learning-congruency effects were 
observed in the sad female condition. Participants learned associations between 
two features (gender and personality characteristics) and generalized this rule in 
order to interpret ambiguous information3.  
Each account predicts that different features of the training paradigm are 
critical to success. According to an Emotional Priming Account the only necessary 
requirement of a training phase is that the participant repeatedly activates or 
accesses valenced information. However, according to an Ambiguity Resolution 
Account, activation of an emotional category is insufficient to modify a bias; the 
participant must instead learn a production rule by repeatedly being presented 
with emotionally ambiguous stimuli and forced (or at least encouraged) to 
interpret it a particular way. One way to compare these two accounts is to modify 
the requirement for ambiguity resolution in the training phase. If an interpretive 
bias emerges through repeated exposure to, and generation of, emotional 
valence, then biases should be observed regardless of whether a participant is 
required to resolve ambiguity or not during training. Alternatively, if interpretive 
biases emerge due to a learned production rule then biases should only emerge 
when participants are required to interpret emotional ambiguity in the training 
phase. If interpretive biases are modified by both mechanisms then removing the 
need for emotional ambiguity resolution should attenuate, but not eliminate the 
effects of training.  
 The manipulation of ambiguity in the training phase was used by Clarke 
and colleagues (2014), who used a modified version of Mathews and 
Mackintosh’s delayed test paradigm. The training phase had two conditions. In 
the Ambiguity present condition, participants heard scenarios that were 
emotionally ambiguous until the final word(s) was presented, which 
disambiguated the scenario in a negative or a benign manner e.g.,  
You are skiing down a slalom slope at high speed. You fall and hear a crack. You 
realise that you have broken a bone/ski 
 
                                                        
3 In this study, as the personality traits were considered to be internal and 
therefore hidden, the determintation of an acquaintance’s inner sadness or 
happiness can be considered a task in resolving ambiguity. 
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 In the Ambiguity absent condition, participants heard similar sentences that did 
not require ambiguity resolution, that is, the sentences they heard were explicitly 
negative or benign e.g.,  
 
You realise that you have broken your bone/ski when you fall and hear a crack. 
You had been skiing down a slalom slope at high speed 
 
 In the Ambiguity Present condition presumably participants start to interpret the 
ambiguous sentence themselves (including the ambiguous word “crack”), but a 
consistently negative or benign final word(s) resolves the ambiguity for them. 
However, in the Ambiguity Absent condition, the valence of the sentence was 
established up front, meaning there was no need for interpretation by the 
participant. 
Following this initial training, all participants heard ten critical sentences 
that remained ambiguous e.g.,  
 
You are trying out some new recipes you found and begin preparing a dish 
to serve your family that night when your partner comes in and makes a comment 
about the smell 
 
In the following test phase, participants saw possible negative and benign 
interpretations of the critical sentences and were asked to rate them in terms of 
their similarity to their original interpretations of the sentences (i.e., a delayed 
recognition test). Consistent with an ambiguity resolution account, only 
participants in the ambiguity present condition rated critical sentences in a 
training-congruent manner. These findings suggest that both activation and 
selection during meaning sense disambiguation are required in the training 
phase in order for interpretive biases to be observed at test. Note however that 
the experimenters used a delayed task at test, and so it may be that training 
effects arose during memory or decision stages, and might not indicate effects of 
training on interpretation per se. 
However, evidence in support of an Emotional Priming Account has also 
been observed, albeit on a methodologically different task. Some researchers 
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within the CBM-I literature differentiate between active tasks - those which 
require the active interpretation of ambiguity - and passive tasks which do not4.  
For example, in Grey and Matthew’s (2000) third experiment, participants 
completed a homograph relatedness task during the training phase and a lexical 
decision task during the test phase.  During training, participants saw 
unambiguous negative or benign primes followed by ambiguous related targets 
(e.g., Water-Drop or Break-Drop). Note that this arrangement is the reverse of 
the usual training procedure, in which the ambiguous word is presented before 
the target. It was argued that this task was a passive one because the ambiguous 
target was preceded by unambiguous primes and there was therefore no need 
for participants to activate multiple possible interpretations of the target. During 
the test phase, participants saw homograph primes followed by negative and 
benign related targets and judged whether the target was a word or a nonword 
(i.e., a lexical decision task). In line with an Emotional Priming Account 
participants showed interpretive biases similar to those seen with traditional 
active training tasks such as word fragment completion training.  
The authors concluded that the active interpretation of ambiguity was not 
necessary to shift biases at test. However, it is possible here to argue that the 
simple presence of ambiguity in the training task (even in the second word of the 
pair) meant that participants spontaneously activated multiple meanings of an 
ambiguous word. Despite the reversal of the traditional training paradigm all 
meanings of an ambiguous word are automatically activated upon onset. 
Therefore, the target word may not have necessarily constrained activation of a 
single meaning from an ambiguous word as proposed by the authors. 
More compelling evidence in support of emotional priming comes from a 
similar study in which Hoppitt et al (2010a) conducted a fragment completion 
training task that was completely unambiguous. In the passive condition 
participants in the negative training condition saw unambiguous negative words 
(e.g., cancer) followed by related word targets (e.g., tumour) and participants in 
the benign condition saw unambiguous benign words (e.g., height) followed by 
related word fragments (e.g., expansion). Participants in the active condition saw 
                                                        
4 Clarke et al.’s (2014) two conditions would both be considered passive, since 
the words are provided by the experimenter 
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ambiguous primes (e.g., growth) followed by related or negative word fragments 
(e.g., height or expansion). The critical difference was that in passive training, the 
prime was unambiguous and so its meaning activation facilitated completion of 
the fragment. However, in active training, the homograph prime was only 
informative if its training-congruent meaning was activated and selected. 
Following training, interpretive biases were tested with a primed lexical decision 
task. Regardless of active or passive training condition, participants exhibited 
training congruent interpretive biases. However, this experiment included 
considerable procedural overlap between training and test, making 
interpretation of the training effect less clear.   
The aim of the two experiments described in this chapter was to 
distinguish between Emotional Priming and Ambiguity Resolution accounts, by 
determining the role of ambiguity resolution during training in biasing the online 
interpretation of emotional meaning. In a typical scenario-based CBM-I training, 
participants read semantically- and affectively-rich sentences, they resolve 
emotional ambiguity, and they generate valenced words to complete the 
fragments.  They therefore generate and select emotional meanings at a number 
of levels and there are therefore a number of features of the training task that 
could affect the later interpretation of emotional ambiguity. In Experiment 3 the 
association between the scenarios and the word fragments in the training phase 
was removed entirely in order to determine whether the generation of 
emotionally-valenced words alone (through the fragment completion task) was 
sufficient to modify biases at test. If, in line with an Emotional Priming account, 
the interpretation of ambiguity can be modified by the repeated generation of 
valenced words, then similar biases to those seen in Experiment 1 are predicted. 
However, if this repeated access to valenced information is not sufficient, then no 
Training x Target interaction is predicted. In Experiment 4, training sentences 
were rewritten so that they were no longer ambiguous; instead they now 
reflected unambiguous negative and benign statements related to the word 
fragments used in Experiment 1. This manipulation was used to assess whether 
repeatedly reading semantically-rich and explicitly-valenced (but not 
ambiguous) sentences was sufficient to shift interpretive biases, or whether the 
resolution of ambiguity, as in Experiment 1 is a critical determiner of bias. 
 56 
Experiment 3 
The aim of Experiment 3 was to determine whether the completion of 
valenced word fragments during training was itself sufficient to alter an 
interpretation bias in line with an Emotional Priming Account. I used the same 
negative (e. g., a_ta_k [attack]) and benign (e. g. , pl_y [play]) word fragments that 
were used in Experiment 1; however the accompanying sentences were 
rewritten so that they were unambiguous, unemotional, and unrelated to the 
original fragments (e.g., Your sister is now working in I. T. ). Essentially the 
sentences acted as ‘fillers’ so that the structure of the training paradigm in 
Experiment 3 closely paralleled that in Experiments 1 and 2, but the only source 
of emotion was the word fragment itself.   The test phase remained identical to 
that in Experiment 1.   
Method 
Participants 
Seventy-four undergraduate students (20 men, 54 women; mean age: 21. 
4 years) participated for course credit. All were native English speakers with 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Participants also reported no current or 
previous diagnoses of depression. They were randomly assigned to receive either 
negative or benign training. The study was approved by the Human Ethics 
Committee, Victoria University of Wellington. All participants gave written 
informed consent prior to participation. 
Stimuli and Apparatus 
The training sentences were rewritten so that they were no longer related 
to the negative and benign word fragments.  The sentences remained self-
referential but were neutral in valence.  As the training sentences were no longer 
related to the fragments, and therefore did not facilitate fragment completion, 
some fragments were slightly altered after piloting by removing different letters 
in order to equate them for difficulty. None of the words used for the fragments 
changed. 
Procedure 
The procedure and design were identical to that of Experiment 1. 
Participants were run individually. 
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Results and Discussion 
Accuracy and mean RTs were calculated as in Experiment 1, and are 
reported in Table 8. The mean time taken to correctly complete word fragments 
in the training phase was 2547 ms and the overall accuracy was 96.3%. Four 
participants were excluded from analysis based on the previous accuracy 
exclusion criteria set for Experiment 1 (d’ < 1.0 in at least one condition). 
Analyses were conducted on the remaining 70 participants, 34 in the negative 
training condition, and 36 in the benign training condition.  
Table 8 
Mean Response Times (ms) and Accuracy of Subjects’ Responses to Targets as a 
Function of Training for Experiment 3 (with Standard Deviations in Parentheses) 
 
 Related Target Valence Unrelated Target Valence 
Training Valence Negative Benign Negative Benign 
 Response Times (ms) 
Negative 
 
947 (204) 
 
911 (150) 
 
1057 (297) 
 
996 (261) 
Benign 
 
904 (168) 
 
879 (152) 
 
1010 (269) 
 
968 (301) 
 Accuracy 
Negative 
 
0.78 (0.10) 
 
0.81 (0.09) 
 
0.90 (0.10) 
 
0.95 (0.05) 
Benign 
 
0.79 (0.11) 
 
0.80 (0.08) 
 
0.90 (0.08) 
 
0.95 (0.06) 
 
Response Times  
RTs to related targets were analysed in a 2 (Training: negative vs. benign) 
x 2 (Target Valence: negative vs. benign) mixed ANOVA with Training as a 
between-subject variable and Valence as a within-subject variable. Importantly 
the interaction did not approach significance, F(1, 68) = .12, p = .74,   𝜂𝑝
2  = .01, 
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indicating that the completion of valenced fragments did not alter participants’ 
interpretation biases. A main effect of valence was found whereby participants 
were faster to identify benign associates of ambiguous primes as related than 
negative associates, F(1, 68) = 3.86, p = .05,  𝜂𝑝
2 = .05. No other significant effects 
were observed.  
Accuracy 
Accuracy on related trials was analysed in a 2 (Training: negative vs. 
benign) x 2 (Target Valence: negative vs. benign) mixed ANOVA. No significant 
effects were observed. Median d’ scores were analysed similarly to RT in a 2 
(Training: negative vs. benign) x 2 (Target Valence: negative vs. benign) mixed 
ANOVA.  There was a main effect of valence, F(1, 68) = 45.46, p < .001,  𝜂𝑝
2  = .394. 
Participants were better able to discriminate between related and unrelated 
word pairs when the target was benign (M = 2.7, SD = .61) than when the target 
was negative (M = 2.28, SD = .57). No other significant effects were observed.  
The results of Experiment 3 argue against a simple Emotional Priming 
Account of modified interpretive biases. Repeatedly accessing negative 
information via word fragment completion was not sufficient to induce an 
interpretation bias. Again, an advantage for benign interpretation of emotionally 
ambiguous words was observed that did not interact with training. However, it is 
not yet clear whether the Ambiguity Resolution Account might still be supported. 
It is possible that in Experiment 1, reading semantically rich, descriptive 
scenarios in combination with the word fragment completion task enhanced 
activation of a valenced context In order to test this account a further study used 
unambiguous but emotionally-valenced senteneces, to asses whether the 
resolution of ambiguity or the exposure to emotional scenarios is a critical factor 
involved in the induction of an interpretation bias.  
Experiment 4 
The aim of Experiment 4 was to further examine the role of ambiguity 
resolution in inducing an interpretation bias. If the repeated resolution of 
emotional ambiguity is a requirement of the training phase, then valenced (but 
unambiguous) scenarios should not modify interpretive biases in a similar way 
to those observed in Experiment 1. The sentences from Experiment 1 were 
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reconstructed to become unambiguously negative and benign statements.  For 
example, the ambiguous sentence The dog is running toward you was altered to 
read either The angry dog is running towards you or The friendly dog is running  
towards you (depending on the training condition). Thus, the sentences kept the 
meanings of the original two possible interpretations, but those meanings were 
presented to participants unambiguously. Participants then completed a related 
word fragment. This manipulation produced meanings that were possibly more 
clearly emotional than the ambiguous sentences. Thus, according to an Emotional 
Priming Account, it is possible that these sentences could produce an even 
stronger training effect than seen in Experiment 1. However, if, as predicted by 
an Ambiguity Resolution Account, the disambiguation of emotional ambiguity is a 
necessary feature of the training phase, then removing the requirement for 
participants to interpret emotional ambiguity during training should eliminate 
the training effects seen at test.  
Method 
Participants 
Seventy-four undergraduate students (all women; mean age: 18.60 years) 
participated for course credit.  All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and 
English was their native language.  Participants also reported no current or 
previous diagnoses of depression.  They were randomly assigned to receive 
either negative or benign training.  The study was approved by the Human Ethics 
Committee, Victoria University of Wellington.  All participants gave written 
informed consent prior to participation.   
Stimuli and Apparatus 
An unambiguous negative sentence and an unambiguous benign sentence 
were constructed from each original ambiguous sentence used in Experiment 1.  
For example, the ambiguous scenario, You are going to a party where you don’t 
know anyone (Word Fragment: scared/excited) became either You are not looking 
forward to the party (Word Fragment: scared) or You are looking forward to the 
party (Word Fragment: excited), depending on the training condition. Otherwise 
all materials were the same as those in Experiment 1 (See Appendix B). 
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Procedure 
 The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 1. Participants were run 
individually. 
Results and Discussion 
Accuracy and mean RTs were calculated as in Experiment 1, and are 
reported in Table 9. The mean time taken to correctly complete word fragments 
in the training phase was 2484 ms and the mean overall accuracy was 95%. 
Three participants were excluded from analysis based on the accuracy exclusion 
criteria as in for Experiment 1 (d’ < 1.0 in at least one condition). Analyses were 
conducted on data from the remaining 71 participants; 34 in the negative 
training condition and 37 in the benign training condition.  
Table 9 
Mean Response Times (ms) and Accuracy of Subjects’ Responses to Targets as a 
Function of Training for Experiment 4 (with Standard Deviations in Parentheses)
  
 
 Related Target Valence Unrelated Target Valence 
Training Valence Negative Benign Negative Benign 
 Response Times (ms) 
 
Negative 
 
940 (196) 
 
932 (146) 
 
1101 (249) 
 
1069 (262) 
 
Benign 
 
912 (166) 
 
889 (136) 
 
1057 (161) 
 
1002 (194) 
 Accuracy 
 
Negative 
 
0.79 (0.11) 
 
0.78 (0.09) 
 
0.88 (0.11) 
 
0.96 (0.03) 
 
Benign 
 
0.80 (0.10) 
 
0.83 (0.10) 
 
0.87 (0.12) 
 
0.93 (0.07) 
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Response Times  
RTs to related targets were analysed in a 2 (Training: negative vs. benign) 
x 2 (Target Valence: negative vs. benign) mixed ANOVA.  No significant effects 
were observed. Notably, the interaction between Training and Target Valence did 
not approach significance F(1, 69) = .22, p = .64, 𝜂𝑝
2  =.01, indicating that valenced, 
but unambiguous, scenarios did not alter an interpretation bias. While the 
pattern of a benign advantage was apparent in the Response Time data (see 
Table 9), it did not reach significance, p = 0.33.  
Accuracy 
Accuracy (hits) was similarly analysed in a 2 (Training: negative vs. 
benign) x 2 (Target Valence: negative vs. benign) mixed ANOVA. No significant 
effects were observed. Median d’ scores were analysed similarly to RT in a 2 
(Training: negative vs. benign) x 2 (Target Valence: negative vs. benign) mixed  
ANOVA.  There was a main effect of valence, F(1, 69) = 28.15, p < .001,  𝜂𝑝
2  = .28. 
Participants were better able to discriminate between related and unrelated 
words when that target was benign (M = 2.62, SD = .56) than when the target was 
negative (M = 2.23, SD = .56). No other significant effects were observed.  
The results of Experiment 4 suggest that comprehending valenced 
unambiguous scenarios and completing related, valenced word fragments was 
not sufficient to alter an interpretation bias. Following training, participants were 
not faster to make relationship judgements to training congruent targets relative 
to training incongruent targets. The failure to find evidence of an interpretive 
bias following training argues against an Emotional Priming Effect as repeatedly 
accessing or activating negative or benign emotional material in the training 
phase did not facilitate the selection of meanings on a later priming task. If an 
emotional priming effect was responsible for inducing a training-consistent 
interpretive bias then effects should be strongest following the manipulation in 
Experiment 4, due to the explicitly valenced information presented within the 
training phase relative to all other experiments.  
 A benign bias was observed in accuracy and a trend towards similar effects 
in response times was observed. It appears that there is a stable advantage for 
benign over negative targets in a relationship decision across all experimental 
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conditions regardless of training condition.  
General Discussion 
Interpretive biases only emerged in Experiment 1a/b, when ambiguity 
resolution was a feature of the training paradigm. These results coupled with a 
failure to find interpretation bias effects in Experiments 3 and 4 support an 
Ambiguity Resolution Account of CBM-I, and argue against an Emotional Priming 
Account. It appears that over the course of the training phase participants 
learned a production rule that dictated their interpretation of novel emotional 
ambiguity. Training appears to act as a global context, which directly and 
specifically impacts the selection of meanings of emotionally ambiguous stimuli 
rather than broadly activating a valenced category and enhancing responses to 
negative information in a more general manner.  
 Similar findings were reported by Clarke and colleagues (2014) who used a 
delayed recognition memory paradigm to test the emergence of an interpretation 
bias following training with and without the requirement for ambiguity 
resolution. Because delayed tasks reflect both selection and post-lexical 
processes, it was possible that ambiguity training in their paradigm affected post-
lexical (i.e., memory, decision, and response processes) and not selection 
processes. However, the present studies used an online priming task at test with 
comparable results to Clarke and colleagues (2014), arguing that ambiguity 
resolution during training is essential for biasing meaning selection. These 
findings support Clark and Colleagues’ (2014) conclusions that an Ambiguity 
Resolution Account explains the observed changes in interpretation following 
CBM-I training. 
However, two previous studies using a semantic priming task at test have 
found evidence that supports an Emotional Priming Account, which is in contrast 
to my own findings (Hoppitt et al 2010a; Grey & Mathews, 2009). There are two 
possible explanations for this discrepancy, both related to task demands. First, 
Hoppitt et al.’s (2010a) and Grey and Mathew’s (2009) studies used single word 
stimuli across both training and test phases. During training, Grey and Mathews 
(2009) asked participants to judge the relationship between primes and targets 
while Hoppitt et al (2000a) asked participants to solve word fragments following 
single word primes. In the test phase of both studies, participants made lexical 
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decisions to targets that were primed by homographs. In both studies lexical 
decisions to training-congruent interpretations of the homographs were 
facilitated regardless of whether the training involved ambiguity resolution or 
not. The procedural overlap in both studies may have resulted in the 
generalisation of certain cognitive processes or strategies across phases.  
A second possible explanation for the discrepancy between my own 
results and those of Hoppitt et al. (2010a) and Grey and Mathews (2009) is the 
use of different tasks in the test phase. Both studies that have found evidence for 
an Emotional Priming Account have used a primed lexical decision task during the 
test phase. Lexical decision tasks have been known to be affected by basic 
orthographic and phonological factors and are likely to index an early stage of 
lexical access that may be more susceptible and sensitive to emotional priming 
effects. On the other hand, semantic relationship judgements are reliant on 
semantic information and therefore necessarily reflect a later stage of lexical 
processing (Hino, Lupker & Pexman, 2002). A relatedness decision was selected 
for all experiments so far, in order to force interpretation of the ambiguous prime 
(Balota & Paul, 1996). However, in Chapter 5, I will determine whether similar 
training effects are observed using a lexical decision task at test.  
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Chapter 5: Testing Modification of Interpretation with a Lexical Decision 
CBM-I research has often relied on semantic priming tasks to assess the 
interpretation of emotional ambiguity following training. Two priming tasks have 
been used in the CBM-I test phases to date, a semantic judgement task (as used 
here in Experiments 1-4) and a lexical decision task. Semantic judgement tasks 
require participants to assess the relationship between a prime word and a 
target word. Alternatively, during a lexical decision task, participants see a prime 
word followed by a string of letters and must indicate whether the string is a 
word or a nonword. In the CBM-I literature, lexical decision tasks and semantic 
judgement tasks have been used interchangeably to assess the presence of an 
interpretation bias. However, there are a number of key differences between 
these two tasks that may reflect different strategies adopted by a participant in 
order to produce a correct response.  
A semantic relationship judgement and a lexical decision require different 
decision processes and participants may rely more heavily on different stages of 
lexical processing in order to complete a given task. In a relatedness judgement, 
the participant must activate and then select a meaning of both the ambiguous 
prime and the target word. Following this, they must compare the two meanings 
for semantic relatedness before making a response. Alternatively, in a lexical 
decision task the participant needs only to activate the lexical entry of the target 
word to correctly judge that it is a word. While lexical decisions do reflect the 
recruitment of semantic information (as seen by semantic priming effects on task 
performance), the task is much more sensitive to lexical factors than a semantic 
relationship judgement which necessarily draws on semantic information. The 
tasks may therefore lead to the adoption of different strategies. Participants 
doing the semantic judgement task would be more likely to engage a strategy 
that considers the relationship between words (which is reliant on selection of a 
prime meaning) than participants in the lexical decision task (which is reliant on 
activation of a particular meaning beyond a word identification threshold).  
Furthermore, lexical decisions are sensitive to a number of factors that do 
not affect responses in a semantic relatedness task. These include orthographic 
properties such as length (e.g., New, Ferrand, Pallier & Brysabaert, 2006) and 
experimental conditions such as the proportion of trials that are related to the 
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prime (Neely, Keefe & Ross, 1989). This suggests that lexical decisions are more 
sensitive to early lexical effects and involve shallower semantic processing, 
whilst semantic judgements reflect the adoption of explicit strategic processes 
driven by later context effects.  
Results from the use of lexical decision tasks within the CBM-I literature 
have been mixed. The first study to use a lexical decision task at test was 
conducted by Grey and Mathews (2000) in their Experiment 2. During the 
training phase participants saw ambiguous primes (e.g., sack), followed by word 
fragments which, when completed, were related to the benign (e.g., bag) or 
negative interpretation (e.g., job) of the prime. In the test phase, participants saw 
ambiguous primes and completed lexical decisions to related negative and 
benign target words. Participants made faster lexical decisions to training-
congruent words, which the authors argued indicated that lexical access was 
biased towards meanings corresponding with the training valence.  
In their Experiment 3 participants completed a training phase in which 
the order of the homograph prime and the related fragment words were 
reversed. This time participants saw word primes (e.g., bag/job), followed by a 
homograph target (e.g., sack). The test phase was the same as Experiment 2.  The 
results mirrored those of Experiment 2 and the authors concluded that training 
with ambiguity resolution was not necessary in order to alter an interpretation 
bias at test, consistent with an Emotional Priming Account. However, the authors 
did not have a way of calculating a priming measure to determine whether 
responses in the test phase were facilitated to all negative targets. They therefore 
could not conclude whether participants only showed facilitation to targets 
following a prime – which would show support for a modified interpretive bias 
following training.  
It has been suggested that biases in interpretation should only occur when 
there is competition between meanings in the test phase (MacLeod & Mathews, 
1991). It therefore follows that an interpretation bias should only appear on 
tasks that evoke competition between meanings (such as following the 
presentation of a homograph) rather than following the presentation of 
unambiguous words.  Grey and Mathews (2009) therefore followed up their 
Experiment 3 (Grey & Mathews, 2000) by removing the presence of ambiguity 
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during the test phase. They predicted that if participants showed facilitated 
response times to targets following unambiguous primes then this would 
support an Emotional Priming Account, as this would be evidence of general 
facilitation for processing of all training congruent stimuli. Participants 
completed the same training as in Experiment 3 in Grey and Mathews (2000). 
Following training, participants completed a lexical decision task for negative 
and benign words following scrambled nonword primes. Because they used 
nonword primes in the test phase, a training congruency effect would reflect 
activation of similarly valenced targets, not priming by the ambiguous 
homograph. No significant interaction was observed between training condition 
and target valence in lexical decision times. The authors concluded that without 
competition between meanings during the test phase, interpretation biases did 
not emerge.  Therefore, biases in the interpretation of ambiguity only occurred 
when participants responded to targets that followed an ambiguous prime and 
not those that followed a nonword prime.  
One other study has used lexical decisions in a test phase following CBM-I 
training. Hoppitt et al. (2010b) used an active and a passive training condition to 
examine the effects of training on lexical decisions at test. During training 
participants completed a word fragment completion task preceded by either 
ambiguous or unambiguous primes e.g.,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Active Training      Passive Training 
 
Figure 7. Active and Passive Training Conditions in a CBM-I training phase 
(adapted from Hoppitt et al., 2010b). 
During the test phase participants completed lexical decisions to word 
and nonword targets that were presented following cued (word) or uncued 
(XXXXX) primes. Cued primes were ambiguous words with one negative and one 
Growth 
T_mour/He_ght 
Cancer/Expansion 
 
T_mour/He_ght 
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benign meaning (e.g., patient) and word targets were either negative (e.g., 
hospital) or benign (e.g., kind) interpretations of the ambiguous prime. No 
significant effects of training were observed on uncued trials, which is consistent 
with Grey and Mathews’ (2009) finding that training did not produce faster 
responses for training-congruent words presented after nonword primes. A 
significant interaction between target valence and training valence was found in 
the cued trials. The authors found that although lexical decisions were faster 
overall for benign targets relative to negative targets, this difference was smaller 
in the negatively trained condition. What the authors failed to do was compute a 
priming measure whereby responses to cued trials could be directly compared to 
responses on uncued trials, to calculate the amount of priming produced by the 
homographs as a function of training.  
 
Figure 8. Priming for Negative and Benign Targets (Uncued trial response time 
– Cued trial response time) as a function of Training Valence (Negative or 
Benign Training). Adapted from Hoppitt et al., (2010b). 
 
However, a priming measure can be calculated from their data by 
subtracting the mean lexical decision times for cued trials from uncued trials. In 
Figure 8, positive values indicate faster response times for cued over uncued 
trials (i.e., priming) in that particular training and target condition. What 
becomes clear is the large amount of priming for lexical decisions to negative 
relative to benign targets following negative training. Therefore the results 
suggest that regardless of whether participants were required to resolve 
ambiguity during negative training, they were faster to call negative targets 
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words relative to benign targets when primed by an ambiguous target.  
Taken together, Hoppitt et al.’s (2010b) and Grey and Mathews (2000, 
2009) results may appear confusing as they suggest that ambiguity resolution 
during training is not required in order for interpretive biases to occur in the test 
phase, which is in line with an Emotional Priming Account. Furthermore, training-
congruent biases only emerged in the test phase when participants were 
required to make lexical decisions to targets following an ambiguous prime, 
which is in line with an Ambiguity Resolution Account.  
It is important to note that an Emotional Priming Account and an 
Ambiguity Resolution Account are not necessarily mutually exclusive. It is quite 
possible that both accounts are valid yet their effects may be observed using 
different priming tasks. It is possible that lexical decisions are more sensitive to 
transient emotional effects, which may drive responses to training-congruent 
valences, like an Emotional Priming Account suggests. On the other hand, a 
semantic relationship judgement recruits greater strategic processing and may 
therefore be more sensitive to the induction of a learned processing rule, in line 
with an Ambiguity Resolution Account. Another important consideration is the 
methodology of the previous lexical decision tasks used in CBM-I studies to date.  
One issue concerns the operationalization of the lexical decision task and 
the specific methodology employed by different researchers. First, lexical 
decisions are much more vulnerable to orthographic and pre-semantic features 
of words such as length (e.g., Balota & Chumbley, 2006). Neither study balanced 
features such as length, which may have led to item-specific variations between 
experiments. Secondly, each study used a different type of prime on uncued 
trials. Whilst Hoppitt et al (2010b) used a series of XXXXX’s on their uncued trials 
Grey and Mathews (2009) simply rescrambled existing homograph primes into 
non-word primes. This is problematic for two reasons. First, without piloting it is 
hard to say whether these words were actually treated as non-words by 
participants. As they were relatively short words, it is possible that the 
scrambled primes resembled the original words enough to act as actual word 
primes (E.g., scrambling sack to sakc). Alternatively, the nonword prime 
facilitation effect suggests that words, or stimuli resembling words may serve to 
“warm up” a lexical processor prior to the presentation of a target therefore 
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disadvantaging targets preceded by a series of X’s (Forster, 1981). In this way 
using scrambled words as uncued stimuli may have unintentionally primed the 
targets, which may explain the sub-threshold appearance of emotional priming 
effects in Grey and Mathews (2009) results. 
Additionally, the overlap between the training and test phases may benefit 
performance and may serve to result in a person adopting a particular strategy 
when completing the task that results in facilitated performance over time rather 
than reflecting the training of an interpretation bias. 
 Questions now arise as to whether training affects the strategies adopted 
by participants in different manners, depending on the task used in the test 
phase. It is possible that different tasks used at test tap different processes, some 
of which may be more influenced by training than others. Based on the results 
from my previous experiments, CBM-I actively changes the selection of a single 
meaning from an ambiguous word, at least when participants are required to 
perform a semantic relatedness decision. The next question is whether these 
biases also emerge on a lexical decision task, which assesses the earlier stage of 
lexical access. Alternatively, the appearance of an interpretive bias on a lexical 
decision task in other studies may reflect methodological artifacts associated 
with overlapping training and test phases or a failure to balance stimuli. The 
studies reported in this thesis so far provide evidence for an Ambiguity 
Resolution Account over an Emotional Priming Account, although as noted before 
the two accounts are not mutually exclusive and are therefore not in competition 
with one another. An Emotional Priming Account predicts training effects on both 
cued and uncued trials, because activation of valenced information during 
training should facilitate access to valenced words at test, regardless of the 
presence or absence of the ambiguous homograph. However, an Ambiguity 
Resolution Account predicts that training effects should only be seen on trials 
cued by a homograph, as training should only affect the interpretation of an 
ambiguous prime.  
Experiment 5 
 The aim of Experiment 5 was to assess the induction of an interpretation 
bias using the same CBM-I training paradigm as used in previous experiments, 
but coupled with a primed lexical decision task at test. Participants completed 
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the scenario-based training phase used in Experiments 1a. In the test phase, 
participants saw word and nonword targets following primes, which were either 
emotionally ambiguous words, or a series of XXXXX’s. Targets were either 
negative or benign words related to the emotionally ambiguous primes, or they 
were scrambled nonwords. Uncued trials allowed me to compute a priming 
measure in order to assess whether training altered an interpretation bias that 
affected responding to primed relative to unprimed targets.  
Method 
Participants 
 Seventy-three undergraduate students (28 men, 45 women; mean age: 20.7 
years) participated for course credit.  All were native English speakers with 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision.  Participants reported no current or 
previous diagnoses of depression.  They were randomly assigned to receive 
either negative or benign training.  The study was approved by the Human Ethics 
Committee, Victoria University of Wellington.  All participants gave written 
informed consent prior to participation. 
Stimuli and Apparatus 
The scenarios used in the training phase were identical to those used in 
Experiment 1a. During the test phase participants saw prime-target pairs and 
made a lexical decision to the target word. Prime-Target pairs for the test phase 
were the same as the pairs used in Experiment 1 however, in half of the trials 
participants saw a nonword preceded by a prime. Construction of nonword 
targets is detailed below.  
Nonword Targets 
Nonwords were created by inputting all word targets from Experiment 1a 
into a pseudoword generator (Keuleers & Brysabaert, 2010). This process 
allowed for generation of nonwords that matched real words on a number of 
orthographic factors such as length, orthographic neighbourhood, bigram 
frequency, Orthographic Levenshtein Distance and Neighbourhood size (Balota & 
Yap, 2006; Balota & Chumbley, 1984). After construction, the selected nonwords 
were balanced so that each nonword was matched on these properties with its 
original word. This allowed for the inclusion of nonwords which did not differ on 
any key properties relative to its original word form. 
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Table 10 shows a typical spread of word and nonword targets for a 
particular ambiguous prime word stalk. During the test phase participants saw a 
prime followed by a target. There were two prime conditions, Cued (e.g., stalk) 
and uncued (e.g., XXXXX ) and two target conditions (word and nonword). Word 
targets were related to the ambiguous prime and were either negative (e.g., 
creep) or benign (e.g., flower) in valence. Nonwords were the matched 
psuedowords generated from the negative and benign target words. 
For the Cued condition the 52 emotionally ambiguous prime words from 
Experiment 1 were used. The Uncued condition simply consisted of 52 strings of 
X’s. Each prime was matched with a word target and a nonword target (See Table 
5). Counterbalancing for the Cued trials meant that if Participant 1 saw the 
ambiguous prime Stalk paired with its negative interpretation Creep then 
Participant 2 would see the same prime paired with its benign interpretation 
Flower. This allowed for an equal distribution of valenced prime-target pairs 
across the experiment and made sure that participants were exposed to each 
meaning of an ambiguous word, once following a homograph prime and once 
following a series of XXXXX’s.  
 
Table 10. 
Example of counterbalancing across participants. Typical trials across two participants as 
a function of list. 
 
 
Prime Type Prime Example Target Type Target Valence Target Example 
Participant 1  
(List 1).  
Cued Stalk 
Word Negative Creep 
Nonword Benign Flimer 
Uncued XXXXX 
Nonword Negative Croop 
Word Benign Flower 
Participant 2  
(List 2) 
Cued Stalk 
Word Benign Flower 
Nonword Negative Croop 
Uncued XXXXX 
Nonword Benign Flimer 
Word Negative Creep 
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This pairing of primes and targets yielded three measures. One is 
response times to cued targets – do participants show facilitated lexical decisions 
to training-congruent targets following an ambiguous cue? This indexes the 
availability of meanings of an ambiguous word following training. Another 
measure is lexical decision response times to uncued trials – do participants 
show facilitated response times to uncued targets in a training congruent 
manner? This indexes facilitated access to training congruent targets, but says 
nothing about ambiguity resolution. Because there is no ambiguity in the prime, 
any observed effects on uncued trials must be caused by emotional priming. The 
third is a computed uncued – cued measure – how much does the ambiguous 
prime speed the response to the target relative to an uninformative prime?  This 
measure reflects any semantic priming provided by the interpretation of the 
ambiguous homograph. 
Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to receive either negative or benign 
training.  Training was identical to that in Experiment 1a.  During the test phase, 
all participants completed the same primed lexical decision task to assess 
interpretative biases.  An ambiguous prime (e.g., stalk; Cued condition) or a 
string of letters (e.g., XXXXXXX; Uncued condition) was presented centrally on the 
screen for 250ms followed by a target that was either a related negative or 
benign word (e.g. , creep or flower) or a nonword (e. g. , flimer or croop) matched 
to the related word.  The time between the onset of the prime and the onset of 
the target was 750ms.  Participants indicated whether the target was a word or a 
nonword by pressing the 1 or 2 key on the number pad of the keyboard.  
Participants responded to 208 trials presented in random order; 104 targets 
were words (52 negative targets and 52 benign targets in each cue condition) 
and 104 targets were nonwords (52 converted from negative related words and 
52 converted from benign related words). The target remained on screen until 
the participant made a response, and was followed by an inter-trial interval of 
1000ms.  The between-subjects variable was training condition (negative or 
benign), and the within-subjects variables were prime type (Cued or Uncued) 
and target valence (negative or benign).  
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Results  
Accuracy and mean RTs were calculated as in Experiment 1, and are 
reported in Table 11. The mean time taken to correctly complete word fragments 
in the training phase was 2364 ms and the mean overall accuracy was 94%. Four 
sensitivity scores were calculated for each participant; their d’ scores, which in 
this experiment is their ability to discriminate between a word and a nonword, to 
cued and uncued negative and benign targets. A criterion for participant 
inclusion was established so that any participant with a d’ score of greater less 
than one in at least one condition was removed. Three participants were 
removed from data analysis. There were then 36 participants in the Negative 
Training Condition and 34 in the Benign Training Condition.  
Response Times 
Response times (RTs) to target words were analysed in a 2 (Training: 
Negative vs. Benign) x 2 (Target Valence: Negative vs. Benign) x 2 Prime Type 
(Cued or Uncued) mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) with Training as a 
between-subject variable and Target Valence and Prime Type as a within-subject 
variable 
There was a main effect of cue type F(1, 68) = 13.39, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .16, 
participants were faster to make lexical decisions to targets preceded by a prime 
(M = 712ms, SD = 162) than to targets preceded by a series of X’s (M = 779ms, SD 
= 169 showing that the homograph primes did facilitate lexical decisions. There 
was a main effect of target valence F(1,66) = 40.22, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .37, participants 
were faster to call benign targets words (M = 734ms, SD = 168) than negative 
targets (M = 758, SD = 169). This mirrors the benign advantage seen for targets 
in previous experiments. No other significant effects were observed. Notably, 
there was no training valence x target valence interaction, F = .001 p = .98, nor a 
training x target  x cue type interaction, F = 1.15, p = .29. Therefore the training 
phase did not induce changes in interpretive bias. 
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Table 10 
Mean Response Times (ms) and Accuracy of Subjects’ Responses to Targets as a 
Function of Training for Experiment 5(with Standard Deviations in Parentheses) 
 Absent Prime Ambiguous Prime 
Training Valence Negative Benign Negative Benign 
 Response Times (ms) 
Negative 816 (204) 802 (213) 756 (203) 726 (196) 
Benign 764 (112) 732 (107) 690 (104) 671 (106) 
 Accuracy 
` .97 (0.03) .96 (0.4) .98 (0.3) .98 (0.3) 
Benign .98 (.03) .97 (.05) .98 (.03) .98 (.03) 
 
The lack of interactions with cue-type show that priming was observed 
equally in all conditions.  
Accuracy 
Accuracy to correctly judge targets as words was analysed in a 2 
(Training: negative vs. benign) x 2 (Target Valence: Negative vs. Benign) x 2 
Prime Type (Cued or Uncued) mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) with Training 
as a between-subject variable and Target Valence and Prime Type as a within-
subject variable. No significant effects were observed 
General Discussion 
The results of Experiment 5 do not support the induction of a training-
congruent interpretation bias on a lexical decision task following CBM-I training. 
Participants were not faster to make lexical decisions to target words that were 
emotionally congruent with their training phase. A typical priming effect was 
observed in response times following training as participants were faster to 
make lexical decisions on cued trials relative to uncued trials. However, this 
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priming benefit did not extend to affective processing of the target. Therefore, 
spreading activation between the word cues and word targets resulted in 
facilitated lexical decision times relative to uncued targets but not in a manner 
biased by training valence.  
Further investigation revealed that, on both cued and uncued trials, there 
was an overall advantage for benign targets in response times. This is interesting 
as one possible interpretation of the benign bias in previous experiments was 
that the benign relationship decision was an easier one. The more likely 
conclusion now is that benign words are simply easier to read than negative 
words. The fact that the benign advantage was equivalent for both cued and 
uncued trials argues against the possibility that participants had a bias to 
interpret the ambiguous homograph benignly, but rather indicates that they 
processed the benign words more quickly. Negative words appear to have a 
processing disadvantage relative to neutral words in other paradigms (e.g., 
Bradley, Mogg & Williams, 1994; Challis and Krance, 1988; Ruiz-Caballero & 
Moreno, 1992; Nakic et al., 2006).  It is thought that highly arousing negative 
information is so salient that it captures attention and disadvantages behavioural 
responses relative to neutral words (Carretie, Martin-Loeches, Hinojosa & 
Mercado, 2008).  
It is likely that the differences in task demands during the test phase are 
responsible for the observation of an interpretive bias in previous experiments 
but not here. The lexical decision task is concerned with judgements of lexical 
form whilst a semantic judgement task is concerned with meaning. It is possible 
that the different task demands encouraged participants to adopt different 
strategies in order to complete the tasks. The relationship decision requires a 
person to interpret the ambiguous prime in order to make a correct response, 
while the lexical decision task asks participants to merely respond to the target. 
The relationship decision therefore forces the participant to select a meaning for 
an ambiguous word before they can respond. Participants in each experiment 
may therefore be using the emotional training context in different ways in order 
to complete the task. In the relationship decision task participants may use 
emotional context to guide the selection of an appropriate meaning from the 
ambiguous prime. However, in the lexical decision task, participants are not 
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drawing on the available context to make decisions about letter strings. 
Interestingly, Hoppitt et al. (2010b) found effects of training on a lexical 
decision task and their results stand in contrast to my own research. However, 
they state that they did not find evidence of an interpretation bias “as it is 
generally understood”. Participants in the negative training condition were faster 
to name negative targets regardless of whether the target was preceded by a 
prime or not. The opposite pattern of results was found for participants in the 
benign training condition. The authors also found that similar results were 
obtained regardless of whether participants were required to resolve ambiguity 
during training or not. It is possible that repeated activation of valenced 
information has a transitory effect on similarly valenced information that does 
not extend to the actual interpretation of emotional ambiguity. However, Hoppitt 
et al.’s task (2010b) involved a high degree of overlap between their training and 
test phases. This could potentially have resulted in participants adopting a 
strategic processing style which facilitated responses to word stimuli in a 
manner that led to the appearance of an interpretation bias. Using procedurally 
distinct training and the test phases so that the same strategies could not be 
employed, I was unable to demonstrate training-congruent facilitation on a 
lexical decision task, as seen in Hoppitt et al. (2010b).  
Unlike the SOA experiment in Chapter 2 that directly looked at the time 
course of access and integration processes, the lexical decision task can tell us 
about the effect of emotional context on the likely strategy employed by a 
participant. It appears that on this task, emotional context did not interfere with 
the availability of meanings and a participant’s ability to respond to a letter 
string following an ambiguous cue. In this case emotion served as a superfluous 
context rather than an informative semantic indicator. Instead it appears that in 
order to obtain training-congruent responding on a task at test, it must require 
that the participants interpret ambiguity.  
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Chapter 6: General Discussion 
 Cognitive Bias Modification for Interpretation has been a growing area of 
research for over a decade (Grey & Mathews, 2000; Mathews & Mackintosh, 
2000; Hallion & Ruscio, 2011; Mene-Lothmann, et al., 2014; Yiend, 2004;). Over 
this time, a number of studies have furthered our understanding of the far-
transfer effects of training (Beard & Amir, 2008; Mackintosh, Mathews, Yiend, 
Ridgeway & Cook, 2006; Salemink, van den Hout & Kindt, 2009; Wilson, 
MacLeod, Mathews & Rutherford, 2006), which has been important for 
elucidating the relationship between interpretive biases and mood effects. 
However, less research has been devoted to understanding the near-transfer 
effects of training (e.g., Hoppitt et al., 2010a, Hoppitt et al., 2010b, Clarke et al., 
2014), which is necessary if we are to discriminate between possible 
mechanisms underlying induced interpretive change. Understanding the 
mechanisms that support CBM-I effects can also give us insight into the cognitive 
processes underlying meaning sense disambiguation more generally (Koster et 
al., 2009).  
 The overarching aim of the series of studies in this thesis was to develop 
and systematically modify a novel CBM-I procedure in order to explore the 
underlying mechanisms of emotional interpretation change. I examined a 
number of key features known to affect lexical ambiguity resolution in order to 
understand their effects on interpretive biases. Specifically, I examined the time-
course of the emergence of interpretive biases, the role of emotional context in 
guiding the selection of an appropriate meaning, and the types of strategies 
employed by participants as a function of task constraints. More broadly, I asked 
the question, what role does emotion play in the interpretation of ambiguous 
language?  
 In Chapter 2, a novel paradigm was developed and administered to shift 
an emotional interpretation bias in either a negative or a benign direction. The 
training paradigm was designed in order to overcome two common limitations 
of CBM-I paradigms.  First, an online probe of interpretation at test was used to 
minimize the potential for effects to arise through post-lexical memory or 
decision processes, which can be recruited in delayed tasks. Second, the 
procedural overlap between the training and test phase were minimised in order 
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to reduce the transfer of procedural factors from training to test. The training 
phase differed from traditional scenario-based CBM-I phases in that the word 
fragment was not a sentence-final word, instead it was an associate of either the 
negative or benign interpretation of the scenario. This means that all of the 
training sentences remained ambiguous, and it was hypothesised that the 
consistently valenced fragments would induce training congruent biases in 
interpretation. Following training, participants were faster to make relationship 
judgements to training-congruent targets following ambiguous word primes. The 
interpretive bias observed following training is similar to interpretive biases 
following previous scenario-based  training phases, suggesting the training 
phase did encourage interpretation of the ambiguous scenarios. The effect was 
further replicated in Experiment 1b, which bolsters evidence for the successful 
modification of an interpretive bias following scenario-based training. 
Chapter 3 shortened the SOA in the test phase in order to shed light on 
the time course over which biased interpretive processes arise following 
training. Decreasing the temporal separation of the prime and the target made it 
possible to present the target to participants before the selection of a single 
meaning had occurred. No differences in relatedness decision response times 
were found as a function of training in the short SOA condition.  The results 
suggest that, rather than affecting the initial activation of each meaning, the 
training phase alters the selection of an appropriate meaning from amongst 
alternatives at a later stage.  
 In Chapter 4, the training paradigm was systematically modified in order to 
isolate the critical features responsible for later changes in the interpretation of 
emotional ambiguity. Interpretive biases were not altered through training when 
participants were required to repeatedly access emotional information by simply 
completing negative or benign word fragments (Experiment 3). Interpretive 
biases were also not shifted when participants completed word fragments 
related to negative or benign unambiguous sentences (Experiment 4). It appears 
that the repeated resolution of emotional ambiguity during training 
(Experiments 1a & 1b) was essential in order to modify an interpretive bias at 
test. These results are in line with an Ambiguity Resolution Account, which states 
that participants learn an implicit procedural strategy during training, and 
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implement it when interpreting novel emotional ambiguity.  
Finally, Chapter 5 investigated the effects of interpretation training when 
participants were required to complete a lexical decision in the test phase. No  
differences in lexical decision response times were observed as a function of 
training, indicating a failure to modify interpretive biases. The scenario-based 
training phase only served to guide meaning resolution processes when the task 
required participants to interpret the prime. These results support the idea that 
emotional context only biased meaning selection when explicit interpretive 
strategies were encouraged in the test phase.   
Figure 9 shows the observed bias in the test phase across all experiments. 
Rightward values indicate a negative bias, and leftward values indicate a benign 
bias. One noticeable feature is the stable benign advantage across all benign 
training conditions. Regardless of experimental condition, participants in benign 
training conditions show a response time advantage for benign interpretations 
of emotionally ambiguous words. This stability in the benign bias across 
experimental manipulations suggests that the experiments are reliably tapping 
interpretive processes. One possible explanation for the benign bias could be 
that benign training does not modify an interpretive bias; instead participants’ 
responses may reflect a general advantage for benign over negative words in the 
test phase.  Most apparent in the figure is the effect of negative training on 
modifying interpretive biases in Experiments 1a and 1b. Only when participants 
were required to complete word fragments which disambiguated scenarios did 
an advantage for negative interpretations emerge in the test phase.  
Implications for Mechanistic Accounts of Modified Interpretive Biases 
The two mechanisms highlighted for investigation in this thesis were 
those of Ambiguity Resolution and Emotional Priming. These accounts are not 
mutually exclusive so it is important to consider the evidence for Emotional 
Priming and Ambiguity Resolution in turn.  
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Figure 9. Mean response time advantage (and 95% Confidence Intervals) for 
Negative Related Targets relative to Benign Related Targets as a function of 
Training Condition and Experiment.  
 
According to an Emotional Priming Account, interpretive bias effects arise 
when emotional information in the training phase broadly activates similar 
concepts within the semantic network. In this way differences in interpretation 
patterns could emerge at early meaning activation stages or later meaning 
selection stages, as training may bias the relative availability of meanings in a 
training-congruent manner. In Experiment 2, when the SOA between the prime 
and the target was shortened, no interaction with training was observed. Here, 
participants were not faster to interpret training-congruent meanings of 
ambiguous words as a function of the training paradigm. These findings argue 
against an early Emotional Priming account and suggest that interpretive 
differences only emerge at a later meaning selection stage, rather than an earlier 
meaning activation stage. Furthermore, in Experiment 5, no differences emerged 
when participants were required to make lexical decisions to negative and 
benign interpretations of emotionally ambiguous words.  This further argues 
against a lexical activation account and highlights the role of selection (as 
required by a semantic task) over activation. The Emotional Priming account 
further posits that repeatedly accessing emotional information in the training 
phase is the critical factor in modifying an interpretive bias. Therefore, if 
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emotional priming could explain changes in interpretation following training, 
then bias shifts should be evident following any training condition that involved 
the repeated presentation of emotionally valenced stimuli. The results of the two 
experiments reported in Chapter 4 argue against this possibility. When the 
relationship between the training scenarios and the word fragments was 
removed so that participants simply completed negative or benign word 
fragments, training did not serve to modify interpretive biases. Furthermore, 
interpretive biases were not observed when participants read strongly valenced 
sentences and completed negative or benign word fragments (the most explicitly 
valenced condition; Experiment 4). If interpretive bias modification can arise 
through emotional priming, then biases should have been modified by the 
emotional information in the fragments (Experiment 3) or in the unambiguous 
sentences (Experiment 4).  
According to an Ambiguity Resolution Account a participant learns to 
apply an implicit production rule when encountering novel instances of 
emotional ambiguity. The Ambiguity Resolution Account predicts that changes in 
interpretation should only be evident at a later meaning selection stage rather 
than an earlier meaning activation stage. In Experiment 2, when the SOA 
between primes and targets was shortened, no differences in relationship 
decision times were noted. Furthermore, in Experiment 5, when participants 
were required to make lexical decisions to negative and benign interpretations of 
ambiguous words, no interaction with training was observed. These findings are 
in support of an Ambiguity Resolution Account as they suggest that changes in 
interpretive biases are only observed at a later selection stage where 
participants are required to interpret the ambiguous prime word. The Ambiguity 
Resolution Account further predicts that changes in meaning section should only 
be observed when a participant is trained to resolve ambiguity during training. 
No changes in interpretive bias were observed when participants simply 
completed valenced word fragments (Experiment 3) or when they read highly 
descriptive, unambiguous emotional scenes (Experiment 4). These findings are 
in line with an Ambiguity Resolution Account, as they suggest that only when 
participants are asked to repeatedly resolve ambiguity does a bias in later 
interpretation occur.  Lewicki et al. (1988) discuss the induction and later 
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production of an implicit procedural rule that might drive the appearance of an 
interpretation bias in an ‘IF /THEN’ manner. According to this account, the 
repeated pairing of certain events (in this case an ambiguous scenario and a 
valenced word) results in an implicit association between the two events and 
encourages the later interpretation (via an encoding algorithm) of further events 
in a similar manner (for a discussion on the cognitive architecture of procedural 
knowledge see Budiu & Anderson, 2004). However, this implicit procedural rule 
was not discussed as being specific to the interpretation of ambiguous stimuli. In 
fact, procedural rules are thought to reflect a broad ability of the cognitive 
system to detect patterns and implicitly learn relationships between features 
and events. In this case, we should have observed similar patterns in Experiment 
4, which similarly trained people to make associations between negative or 
benign scenarios and emotionally related word fragments. Why then is this effect 
only observed on a task that trains the explicit interpretation of emotional 
ambiguity? One possibility is that the CBM-I task in Experiments 1a and 1b 
trained a much more specific rule than has been seen in previous encoding 
algorithm studies (e.g., Lewicki, Hill & Boss, 1989). 
In this thesis, interpretive biases were only shifted when the training and 
the test phases were matched on task purpose e.g., activate possible meanings in 
the presence of ambiguity and then select one candidate.  In this way, the 
training phase may have encouraged the adoption of a particular strategy which 
only guarantees success if the stimuli in the training phase are also ambiguous 
and the task requires interpretation of the prime. This would certainly explain 
the failure to find training effects in Experiment 5, when interpretation of the 
prime was not necessary.  
One interesting implication of the ambiguity resolution account is that 
emotion is not a critical component of training – rather it simply acts as another 
source of semantic information. Theoretically then the training phase may not be 
limited to the modification of emotion-specific interpretation biases, and an 
interpretive bias could conceivably be shifted by training an unemotional 
production rule. For example, using a similar training phase as Experiment 1 
participants could read ambiguous scenarios describing an unidentified object 
coupled with associated word fragments related to living and non-living objects. 
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Following training, participants could classify homograph primes with one living 
and one non-living interpretation (e.g., Bat) to examine whether a non-emotional 
implicit production rule had been trained.  Such a demonstration would 
strengthen the conclusion that a similar training mechanism is at work in CBM-I. 
One way that emotion may be considered to be important regarding 
interpretive biases is in the field of emotional disorders. While the aim of this 
thesis was not to examine mood effects of CBM-I, it is clear that mood plays an 
important role in linking clinical disorders with biased processing and may in 
part, explain changes in interpretative biases following training. Training-
congruent changes in depression and anxiety have been documented following 
many CBM-I studies (Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000; Mackintosh, et al., 2006; 
Steinman & Teachman, 2010). Mediational analyses have revealed that CBM-I 
training has a direct effect on state anxiety and an indirect effect, via 
modification of interpretive biases, on trait anxiety (Salemink, van den Hout & 
Kindt, 2010). It is possible that changes in state anxiety encourage participants 
to respond in line with their emotional state. While the results of this thesis 
suggest no specialized role of emotional context in language, clinically, emotion 
has relevance in that it affects a set of cognitive processes in a mood-relevant 
manner. Therefore, further research comparing interpretive processes between 
healthy and clinical populations will further shed light on the importance of 
emotion in language processing and psychopathology.  
Implications for Theories of Meaning Sense Disambiguation 
 Selection 
Typically, theories of lexical access have focussed on modelling perceptual 
and activation processes involved in early word identification (Duffy et al., 1988; 
Twilley & Dixon, 2000). However, all models either explicitly or implicitly state a 
role of meaning selection, as this is necessary for word and discourse 
comprehension, and for communication in general. The predictions generated in 
this thesis were derived from the Reordered Access account (Duffy et al., 1988) 
and the Independent Activation Model (Twilley & Dixon, 2000), both of which 
posit that meaning sense disambiguation is a two-stage process; activation of all 
potential meanings, followed by selection of the most appropriate meaning The 
results of this thesis are consistent with these accounts, which state that upon 
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presentation of an ambiguous word both the contextually-appropriate, and the 
contextually-inappropriate meanings receive activation. This premise is 
supported by the findings of Experiment 1a and 1b and Experiment 2. At a short 
SOA, training context did not affect the activation of meanings. However, at a 
long SOA, the contextually appropriate meaning received greater activation and 
therefore responses were faster for training-congruent meanings over training-
incongruent meanings. Overall, these results support the idea that global context 
provided by training works over time to bias late meaning selection processes 
rather than the early activation of meaning associates.  
Suppression 
 Although all meanings of an ambiguous word appear to be activated, 
only the most appropriate meaning is selected. What happens to the unselected 
meaning? Although models of ambiguity processing focus on the selection of the 
appropriate meaning, there has been some discussion around the fate of the 
unselected meaning. While it is difficult to ascertain what happens to the 
unselected meaning from the current behavioural tasks, it is possible that 
training encouraged the suppression of non-selected meanings in Experiment 1a 
and 1b. Chwilla and Kolk (2003) suggest that inhibition processes are not 
recruited during a lexical decision due to task demands, and inhibition is only 
recruited in semantic decisions due to the need to select one meaning over 
another. In Experiment 5, participants were not actively looking for a semantic 
relationship between primes and targets and therefore did not rely on an 
inhibition process in order to make a correct decision. This may explain why 
interpretive biases were observed in Experiments 1a and 1b and not Experiment 
5.  
There is no consensus in the literature as to the mechanism or even the 
existence of suppression processes in meaning selection. However, there are two 
models which try to explain how inhibition or activation processes may play a 
role in the final selection of a meaning. According to decay models, context (in 
this case, the training scenarios) maintains the activation of an appropriate 
meaning while the inappropriate meaning loses activation over time, ultimately 
resulting in selection (e.g., Simpson & Burgess, 1985; Duffy et al., 1988). 
However, according to inhibition models, the preceding context actively inhibits 
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the inappropriate meaning relative to the appropriate meaning, guiding selection 
of the meaning with the greater activation (e.g., Simpson & Kang, 1995). It is 
possible that suppression stems from the training context and either works in 
isolation or in combination with the selected meaning. In this way the scenario-
based training used in the current series of experiments could directly affect the 
inhibition of the unselected meaning, which fosters the emergence of an 
interpretive bias.  In a relationship task it is difficult to assess what happens to 
the unselected meaning, because related and unrelated decisions are functionally 
different processes and therefore cannot be directly compared. One way to 
assess suppression could be to use ERP, an online measure of cognitive 
processing, in order to examine the activation levels of different meaning 
candidates over time and as a function of training. For example, particular ERP 
components are known to index early emotional recognition of words and the 
later integration of word meanings into a broader context. Using ERP we could 
examine the effect that interpretive training has on different aspects of word 
recognition and meaning selection. For example, does training impact the early 
evaluation of word arousal or valence, or does it only impact later integration 
stages where the selection of a word meaning is affected? By using ERP measures 
to examine cognitive processes as they unfold over time we can examine the 
relative availability of different word meanings over time and examine processes 
of activation and inhibition in action. 
Importantly, models of meaning selection and suppression altogether 
ignore the potential role of emotional context as a source of information. In this 
thesis I was able to demonstrate that repeatedly disambiguating emotionally 
ambiguous scenarios in a negative or a benign manner facilitated later selection 
of emotionally-congruent meanings from novel ambiguous words. The results of 
this thesis suggest that emotion acts as a late-acting context, which guides 
selection in a manner similar to other forms of semantic information. Therefore, 
emotion appears to act similarly to other forms of semantic information, in line 
with Bower’s emotional network model (1981). Bower’s model conceives 
emotional information as being coupled with other categories of semantic 
information in networks, and activation occurs through spreading activation to 
similar conceptual information. However, whilst the emotional context of the 
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training phase increases the relative speed with which an emotionally-congruent 
meaning is selected, it does not increase the efficiency with which ambiguous 
words are processed. Participants are not typically more accurate at identifying 
training-congruent meanings suggesting that training does not serve to totally 
inhibit one meaning. Instead training influences the speed with which an 
appropriate meaning is judged as related relative to the inappropriate meaning. 
Whether this occurs by increasing the activation of an appropriate meaning or by 
inhibiting the unselected meaning remains to be understood.  
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
Far-transfer tasks are essential if we are to demonstrate the ecological 
validity of CBM-I as a paradigm and reveal its ability to generalise to other areas 
of emotional reactivity. The main aim of this thesis was not to examine the far-
transfer effects of training, such as the emotional outcomes on mood state 
measures. While this restricts the ability of the current experiments to shed light 
on the relationship between interpretive biases and psychopathology, the 
findings point to a future direction for far-transfer studies. One way to extend 
this research would be to examine the resulting effects of my different training 
procedures on emotional outcomes in order to determine whether emotional 
reactivity is impacted in the same manner as interpretive biases. The implicit 
assumption in all far-transfer studies is that the effects of training on the 
emotional outcome are mediated by alterations in interpretation (hence the 
name Cognitive Bias Modification for Interpretation). The results of future 
studies could have implications for better understanding the different impact of 
active and passive training tasks on resulting emotional outcomes.  All the 
training phases in this thesis can be considered to be active tasks, as they require 
the active generation of negative or benign disambiguating words. Previous 
research suggests that active tasks are a critical feature in the later modification 
of mood or anxiety (e.g., Hertel & Mathews, 2011). For example, even though 
Hoppitt and colleagues (2010a) observed effects of passive training on primed 
lexical decision (a near- transfer task), only active training affected anxiety when 
participants later viewed a video of a car accident (a far-transfer task). Similar 
effects of active training on far-transfer tasks are reported by Hoppitt et al. 
(2010b) who found that active training in a traditional scenario-based paradigm 
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was necessary to alter the emotionality of mental images generated in response 
to an ambiguous sentence. The results from Experiments 1a and 1b suggest that 
ambiguity resolution is a necessary feature to induce interpretive change, and 
not the repeated access to negative unambiguous information. If training-
congruent mood changes are only observed following the active resolution of 
emotional ambiguity, like interpretation biases are, this could have far-reaching 
implications for the development of treatment programmes for emotional 
disorders and for understanding of the causal relationship between  interpretive 
biases and psychopathology.  
Another limitation of my research has to do with the apparent fragility of 
the interpretive bias effect. Interpretive biases on a relationship decision task 
were only observed when participants were required to disambiguate 
emotionally ambiguous scenarios and in no other training conditions. This may 
limit the extent of the effect as it suggests that a very specific strategy has been 
trained rather than the modification of an interpretive bias that may transfer to 
other tasks. While recent meta-analyses reveal that CBM-I training has a 
relatively strong effect on interpretation biases (g = 0.81, Hallion & Ruscio, 
2011), there was large variation between the types of tasks included for analysis. 
This means that tasks that may not reflect a true change in interpretive bias (e.g., 
delayed tasks) were included in the analysis. A recent review of CBM-I has 
highlighted a low number of quality studies, with small N and possible evidence 
of publication bias, highlighting the need for a structured approach to 
determining the critical factors involved in modifying an interpretive bias and 
defining the extent of training effects (Cristea, Kok & Cuijpers, 2015). Therefore 
in order to ascertain the impact of training on true interpretive change, further 
research must take place examining the generalisation of interpretive biases to 
other tasks and measures of moods to ensure the validity of the effect. 
Finally, I did not include a no-training control condition within this set of 
studies in order to determine a baseline against which negative and benign 
training effects could be compared. It is important to look further into the 
discrepant effects of negative and benign training effects, as it is not certain that 
these effects work by the same mechanisms or have completely opposing effects 
on interpretive biases to one another. Negative valence is a better constrained 
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emotional category, and possibly better suited for researching the impact of 
training on psycholinguistic variables than benign valence, which is a mixture of 
positive and neutral interpretations. However, benign (or even positive) training 
may be more clinically relevant, and may better reveal the role of alleviated 
biases on mood and emotional reactivity. Whilst it is possible to consider 
Experiment 3 as a possible control condition, as participants simply read 
unambiguous scenarios, a true no-training baseline would establish a point from 
which other research into underlying negative and benign processing biases 
could be examined.  
Conclusions 
In a series of studies, the near-transfer effects of CBM-I training were 
investigated. Traditionally, little consideration has been given to the types of 
methodology used during CBM-I training or test phases. As a result, previous 
studies have been limited in their ability to inform our understanding of the 
conditions under which an interpretive bias is likely to emerge, or to establish 
the mechanism(s) that might subserve the induction of an emotional 
interpretation bias.  Instead, research has tended to focus on the relationship 
between emotional interpretive biases and measures of emotional reactivity, 
emotional regulation or mood state. Overall, the results of the studies within this 
thesis suggest that a genuine change in interpretive processing takes place 
following a single application of the novel scenario-based training used in this 
thesis. However, a change in interpretive bias is dependent on ambiguity 
resolution in the training phase, only appears at a later selection stage of 
meaning resolution and is dependent on semantic evaluation of the relationship 
between the prime and the target.  
In conclusion, the results of this thesis highlight the need for further 
research in the area of interpretive bias and the importance of considering the 
ways in which applied clinical and psycholinguistic research domains can inform 
one another. It is important to consider the role of interpretation beyond 
linguistic situations, as interpretation plays a role in our understanding of many 
emotionally ambiguous situations including our processing of facial expressions, 
tone of voice and the actions and intentions of other people. The interpretation of 
emotional ambiguity is an efficient and relatively unconscious process that 
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informs our understanding of the world and determines our later actions and 
interactions with others. As a result interpretations contribute greatly to our 
understanding of the world and have implications for our future behaviour and 
interactions. There is still a lot more research to be done on interpretive 
processes, their dysfunction in clinical disorders and the implications for how we 
navigate and understand the world around us. 
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Appendix A 
Training Scenarios for Experiment 1a, 1b, 2 and Experiment 5. 
Ambiguous Scenario 
Negative  
Word Fragment 
Completed 
Fragment 
You need to take some time off for the ceremony. F_ne_al Funeral 
Your mother calls to tell you the news. D_a_h Death 
You are going to a party where you don't know anyone. Scar_d Scared 
Your phone rings early in the morning. Ac_id_nt Accident 
You are walking down an alleyway when you notice 
something. Ro_b_r Robber 
You try on some clothing but your friend advises you not 
to buy it. U_ly Ugly 
You hear your friends discuss a party that you were 
unaware of. E_cl_ded Excluded 
 You notice your friend’s face as she opens your present. Dis_ppoi_ted Disappointed 
You are thinking about your new job. An_i_us Anxious 
You are talking to an acquaintance who keeps looking out 
the window. B_ri_g Boring 
A noise in the middle of the night wakes you up. B_r_lar  Burglar 
The test result reflects your abilities. F_il Fail 
Your mother never expected you to become who you are. Pr_so_   Prison 
You've got an unusual passion. Fr_ak Freak 
The dog is running towards you. At_a_k Attack 
You can feel the sweat running down your spine. T_r_or Terror 
You notice a man wearing dark glasses. Su_pic_ous Suspicious 
You notice the car is going a lot faster than the bike. D_nge_ous Dangerous 
Your coffee is really hot. Bu_n Burn 
Suddenly the lights go out and you hear voices. In_r_der Intruder 
Your lawyer registers the value of your property. D_vo_ce Divorce 
No-one can finish the dinner you made. Dis_ust_ng Disgusting 
The boss wants to talk to you. Fir_d Fired 
When you reach the bus stop, people are laughing.  Los_r Loser 
Everyone is quiet during your presentation. A_le_p   Asleep 
Your child can't walk D_sab_ed Disabled 
People laugh as you deliver your speech S_up_d Stupid 
Everyone is looking at you. Em_arr_ssed Embarrassed 
Not many of your friends are around these days. Re_ect_d Rejected 
Your puppy is lying very still. D_ad   Dead 
You're usually single. Un_tt_active Unattractive 
Your flat is very cheap to rent. D_r_y Dirty 
The class gives you feedback about your speech. Ne_at_ve Negative 
Your sister is now bald. C_n_er Cancer 
You've got nothing to do today. Bo_ed     Bored 
Your flatmate yells for you to come downstairs. Tr_u_le Trouble 
You can't accept the job offer. Il_n_ss Illness 
You may as well give away the baby clothes now. Misc_rria_e Miscarriage 
You notice something in the stranger's hand. W_ap_n Weapon 
Your partner has something to tell you Du_p_d Dumped 
You don’t have many friends here. Al_ne Alone 
You take a deep breath and jump. Su_ci_e Suicide 
You're very different to anyone your partner has ever 
dated. W_r_e Worse 
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You feel something brushing your arm. S_id_r Spider 
The smell hits you as soon as you walk into the room. Un_le_sant Unpleasant 
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Ambiguous Scenario 
Benign 
Word Fragment 
Completed 
Fragment 
You need to take some time off for the ceremony. Gr_dua_ion Graduation 
Your mother calls to tell you the news. Mar_i_ge Marriage 
You are going to a party where you don't know anyone. ex_it_d Excited 
Your phone rings early in the morning. Bi_th Birth 
You are walking down an alleyway when you notice 
something. C_t Cat 
You try on some clothing but your friend advises you not to 
buy it. E_pens_ve Expensive 
You hear your friends discuss a party that you were 
unaware of. in_it_d Invited 
 You notice your friend’s face as she opens your present. del_ght_d Delighted 
You are thinking about your new job. p_eas_d Pleased 
You are talking to an acquaintance who keeps looking out 
the window. di_trac_ed Distracted 
A noise in the middle of the night wakes you up. D_g Dog 
The test result reflects your abilities. sm_rt Smart 
Your mother never expected you to become who you are. pr_ud Proud 
You've got an unusual passion. In_er_sting Interesting 
The dog is running towards you. pl_y Play 
You can feel the sweat running down your spine. s_m_er Summer 
You notice a man wearing dark glasses. su_sh_ne Sunshine 
You notice the car is going a lot faster than the bike. ove_t_ke Overtake 
Your coffee is really hot. De_ic_ous Delicious 
Suddenly the lights go out and you hear voices. Mo_ie Movie 
Your lawyer registers the value of your property. Ins_ra_ce Insurance 
No-one can finish the dinner you made. Fu_l Full 
The boss wants to talk to you. pr_mo_ed Promoted 
When you reach the bus stop, people are laughing.  f_nny Friendly 
Everyone is quiet during your presentation. at_ent_ve Attentive 
Your child can't walk i_f_nt Infant 
People laugh as you deliver your speech f_n_y Funny 
Everyone is looking at you. po_ul_r Popular 
Not many of your friends are around these days. ove_se_s Overseas 
Your puppy is lying very still. as_eep Asleep 
You're usually single. Ca_efr_e Carefree 
Your flat is very cheap to rent. ba_g_in Bargain 
The class gives you feedback about your speech. Po_it_ve Positive 
Your sister is now bald. ecce_tr_c Eccentric 
You've got nothing to do today. rel_x Relax 
Your flatmate yells for you to come downstairs. so_iabl_ Sociable 
You can't accept the job offer. com_itt_d Committed 
You may as well give away the baby clothes now. Gr_wn Grown 
You notice something in the stranger's hand. p_one Phone 
Your partner has something to tell you L_ve Love 
You don’t have many friends here. F_rei_n Foreign 
You take a deep breath and jump. swi_mi_g Swimming 
You're very different to anyone your partner has ever dated. sp_c_al Special 
You feel something brushing your arm. Gra_s Grass 
The smell hits you as soon as you walk into the room. ince_s_ Incense 
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Appendix B 
Training Scenarios for Experiment 4 
Ambiguous Scenario New Negative Scenario Word Fragment 
You need to take some time off for the ceremony. Your dead grandmother's service is 
today 
Funeral 
Your mother calls to tell you the news. Your upset mother calls to tell you the 
news 
Death 
You are going to a party where you don't know 
anyone. 
You are not looking forward to the party Scared 
Your phone rings early in the morning. Your phone call is unexpected Accident 
You are walking down an alleyway when you 
notice something. 
You hear a shout as you are walking 
down an alleyway 
Robber 
You try on some clothing but your friend advises 
you not to buy it. 
Your friend tells you the dress is too ugly Ugly 
You hear your friends discuss a party that you 
were unaware of. 
You don't receive a party notification on 
facebook 
Excluded 
You notice your friend’s face as she opens your 
present. 
Your upset friend dislikes her birthday 
present 
Disappointed 
You are thinking about your new job. You haven't been offered a new job Anxious 
You are talking to an acquaintance who keeps 
looking out the window. 
Your friend isn't listening to you talk Boring 
A noise in the middle of the night wakes you up. A stranger enters your house Burglar 
The test result reflects your abilities. You are unhappy with your test results Fail 
Your mother never expected you to become who 
you are. 
Your unsupportive peers judge your 
actions 
Prison 
You've got an unusual passion. Your unhealthy hobby is absorbing Freak 
The dog is running towards you. The angry dog is running towards you Attack 
You can feel the sweat running down your spine. Sitting in anticipation makes you sweat Terror 
You notice a man wearing dark glasses. A dodgy man is standing next to you Suspicious 
You notice the car is going a lot faster than the 
bike. 
The car behind you is driving too slowly Dangerous 
Your coffee is really hot. You hate hot coffee Burn 
Suddenly the lights go out and you hear voices. You are terrified as the lights go out in 
your house 
Intruder 
Your lawyer registers the value of your property. You are forced to value all your 
posessions 
Divorce 
No-one can finish the dinner you made. Your upset guests can't finish the meal 
you made 
Disgusting 
The boss wants to talk to you. Your angry boss wants to chat to you Fired 
When you reach the bus stop, people are laughing.  Your friends ignore you at the bus stop Loser 
Everyone is quiet during your presentation. The bored people listen to your talk Asleep 
Your child can't walk. Your sick child hasn't started walking Disabled 
People laugh as you deliver your speech. People laugh meanly as you deliver your 
speech 
Stupid 
Everyone is looking at you. Your clumsiness makes everyone laugh Embarrassed 
Not many of your friends are around these days. You don't receive postcards from your 
friends 
Rejected 
Your puppy is lying very still. Your sick puppy is lying very still Dead 
You're usually single. Your date stands you up Unattractive 
Your flat is very cheap to rent. Your gross flat is very cheap to rent Dirty 
The class gives you feedback about your speech. Your disappointed teacher gives you 
feedback about the test 
Negative 
Your sister is now bald. Your sick sister has shaved her head Cancer 
You've got nothing to do today. You are sad you have nothing on today Bored 
Your flatmate yells for you to come downstairs. Your mad flatmate yells at you to come 
downstairs 
Trouble 
You can't accept the job offer. You are too sick to accept the job offer Illness 
You may as well give away the baby clothes now.                                          Your wife lost the baby Miscarriage 
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You notice something in the stranger's hand. The armed stranger confronts you Weapon 
Your partner has something to tell you. Your angry partner has something to tell 
you 
Dumped 
You don’t have many friends here. As an outsider you haven't made new 
friends yet 
Alone 
You take a deep breath and jump. You jump off the bridge Suicide 
You're very different to anyone your partner has 
ever dated. 
Your upset partner comments on your 
individuality 
Worse 
You feel something brushing your arm. You brush cobwebs off your arm Spider 
The smell hits you as soon as you walk into the 
room. 
The smell of decay hits you when you 
walk into the room 
Unpleasant  
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Ambiguous Scenario New Benign Scenario Word Fragment 
You need to take some time off for the ceremony. Your brother's degree celebration is today Graduation 
Your mother calls to tell you the news. Your excited mother calls to tell you the 
news 
Marriage 
You are going to a party where you don't know 
anyone. 
You are looking forward to the party Excited 
Your phone rings early in the morning. Your wakeup call is expected Birth 
You are walking down an alleyway when you 
notice something. 
You hear a meow as you are walking down 
an alleyway 
Cat 
You try on some clothing but your friend advises 
you not to buy it. 
Your friend tells you the dress is too much Expensive 
You hear your friends discuss a party that you 
were unaware of. 
You receive a party notification on 
facebook 
Invited 
You notice your friend’s face as she opens your 
present. 
Your delighted friend loves her birthday 
present 
Delighted 
You are thinking about your new job. You have been offered a new job Pleased 
You are talking to an acquaintance who keeps 
looking out the window. 
Your friend is listening to you talk Distracted 
A noise in the middle of the night wakes you up. Your dog enters your house Dog 
The test result reflects your abilities. You are pleased with your test results Smart 
Your mother never expected you to become who 
you are. 
Your supportive peers judge your actions Proud 
You've got an unusual passion. Your exciting hobby is absorbing Interesting 
The dog is running towards you. The friendly dog is running towards you Play 
You can feel the sweat running down your spine. Sitting in the sun makes you sweat Summer 
You notice a man wearing dark glasses. A sunburnt man is standing next to you Sunshine 
You notice the car is going a lot faster than the 
bike. 
The car in front of you is driving slowly Overtake 
Your coffee is really hot. You love hot coffee Delicious 
Suddenly the lights go out and you hear voices. You are excited as the lights go out in the 
movie theatre 
Movie 
Your lawyer registers the value of your property. You want to value all your posessions Insurance 
No-one can finish the dinner you made. Your happy guests can't finish the meal 
you made 
Full 
The boss wants to talk to you. Your friendly boss wants to chat to you Promoted 
When you reach the bus stop, people are laughing.  Your friends are smiling at you at the bus 
stop 
Friendly 
Everyone is quiet during your presentation. The absorbed people listen to your talk Attentive 
Your child can't walk. Your young chid hasn't started walking  Infant 
People laugh as you deliver your speech. People laugh appreciatively as you deliver 
your speech 
Funny 
Everyone is looking at you. Your jokes make everyone laugh Popular 
Not many of your friends are around these days. You receive postcards from your friends Overseas 
Your puppy is lying very still. Your exhausted puppy is lying very still Asleep 
You're usually single.                                                 You enjoy being single Carefree 
Your flat is very cheap to rent. Your beautiful flat is very cheap to rent Bargain 
The class gives you feedback about your speech. Your proud teacher dives you feedback 
about the test 
Positive 
Your sister is now bald. Your unique sister has shaved her head Eccentric 
You've got nothing to do today. You are happy that you have nothing on 
today 
Relax 
Your flatmate yells for you to come downstairs. Your excited flatmate yells at you to come 
downstairs 
Sociable 
You can't accept the job offer. You are too in demand to accept the job 
offer 
Committed 
You may as well give away the baby clothes now.                                        Your child no longer fits 
their baby clothes 
Grown 
You notice something in the stranger's hand. The lost stranger confronts you Phone 
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Your partner has something to tell you. Your adoring partner has something to tell 
you 
Love 
You don’t have many friends here. As an immigrant you haven't made new 
friends yet 
Foreign 
You take a deep breath and jump. You dive off the bridge Swimming 
You're very different to anyone your partner has 
ever dated. 
Your caring partner comments on your 
individuality 
Special 
You feel something brushing your arm. You brush clippings off your arm Grass 
The smell hits you as soon as you walk into the 
room. 
The smell of lavender hits you when you 
walk into the room 
Incense 
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Appendix C 
Prime and Target words  for Experiment 4 
Prime – 
List A Target Valence RelType 
Prime– 
List B Target Valence Reltype 
arms weapons Negative Related arms legs Neutral Related 
beat bash Negative Related beat rhythm Neutral Related 
bit insect Negative Related bit part Neutral Related 
block obstruct Negative Related block apartment Neutral Related 
box fight Negative Related box gift Neutral Related 
break smash Negative Related break lunch Neutral Related 
club assault Negative Related club group Neutral Related 
crush destroy Negative Related crush like Neutral Related 
desert abandon Negative Related desert sand Neutral Related 
escape flee Negative Related escape holiday Neutral Related 
fall over Negative Related fall autumn Neutral Related 
fell down Negative Related fell trees Neutral Related 
fine penalty Negative Related fine happy Neutral Related 
flounder drown Negative Related flounder fish Neutral Related 
frame crime Negative Related frame picture Neutral Related 
glare angy Negative Related glare sun Neutral Related 
grill interrogate Negative Related grill barbeque Neutral Related 
hamper stop Negative Related hamper picnic Neutral Related 
hard difficult Negative Related hard concrete Neutral Related 
hiding whipping Negative Related hiding game Neutral Related 
hit whack Negative Related hit successful Neutral Related 
issue difficulty Negative Related issue magazine Neutral Related 
jerk idiot Negative Related jerk tug Neutral Related 
lash whips Negative Related lash eye Neutral Related 
leaves goes Negative Related leaves plant Neutral Related 
left deserted Negative Related left right Neutral Related 
mean average Neutral Related mean cruel Negative Related 
miss lady Neutral Related miss lonely Negative Related 
parting hair Neutral Related parting goodbye Negative Related 
patient tolerant Neutral Related patient sick Negative Related 
poach egg Neutral Related poach steal Negative Related 
punch drink Neutral Related punch fist Negative Related 
quack duck Neutral Related quack doctor Negative Related 
ram sheep Neutral Related ram shoulder Negative Related 
sack potatoes Neutral Related sack job Negative Related 
shady sunny Neutral Related shady dodgy Negative Related 
slip petticoat Neutral Related slip stagger Negative Related 
squash vegetable Neutral Related squash flat Negative Related 
stalk flower Neutral Related stalk creep Negative Related 
stole fur Neutral Related stole thief Negative Related 
strain noodles Neutral Related strain stress Negative Related 
strained sieve Neutral Related strained tired Negative Related 
strike bowling Neutral Related strike slap Negative Related 
striking attractive Neutral Related striking beating Negative Related 
stub ticket Neutral Related stub hurt Negative Related 
tackle bait Neutral Related tackle grab Negative Related 
tank water Neutral Related tank war Negative Related 
tart pie Neutral Related tart slut Negative Related 
terminal airport Neutral Related terminal dying Negative Related 
trip vacation Neutral Related trip stumble Negative Related 
vice tool Neutral Related vice sin Negative Related 
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will urge Neutral Related will inheritance Negative Related 
arms trousers Neutral Unrelated arms greedy Negative Unrelated 
beat vest Neutral Unrelated beat liar Negative Unrelated 
bit swing Neutral Unrelated bit phony Negative Unrelated 
block fly Neutral Unrelated block hateful Negative Unrelated 
box poster Neutral Unrelated box jealous Negative Unrelated 
break paint Neutral Unrelated break coffin Negative Unrelated 
club windmill Neutral Unrelated club deaf Negative Unrelated 
crush kettle Neutral Unrelated crush nasty Negative Unrelated 
desert bacon Neutral Unrelated desert bitter Negative Unrelated 
escape hammer Neutral Unrelated escape scold Negative Unrelated 
fall boat Neutral Unrelated fall owe Negative Unrelated 
fell brush Neutral Unrelated fell dirt Negative Unrelated 
fine lawn Neutral Unrelated fine noose Negative Unrelated 
flounder cup Neutral Unrelated flounder disease Negative Unrelated 
frame hairpin Neutral Unrelated frame dislike Negative Unrelated 
glare beverage Neutral Unrelated glare anorexic Negative Unrelated 
grill folder Neutral Unrelated grill dull Negative Unrelated 
hamper diary Neutral Unrelated hamper fake Negative Unrelated 
hard elephant Neutral Unrelated hard smelly Negative Unrelated 
hiding driver Neutral Unrelated hiding toxic Negative Unrelated 
hit jacket Neutral Unrelated hit vomit Negative Unrelated 
issue leg Neutral Unrelated issue squeeze Negative Unrelated 
jerk fork Neutral Unrelated jerk bomb Negative Unrelated 
lash knee Neutral Unrelated lash fearful Negative Unrelated 
leaves lock Neutral Unrelated leaves germs Negative Unrelated 
left tall Neutral Unrelated left dumb Negative Unrelated 
mean crash Negative Unrelated mean pebble Neutral Unrelated 
miss zombie Negative Unrelated miss rubber Neutral Unrelated 
parting garbage Negative Unrelated parting silk Neutral Unrelated 
patient bullet Negative Unrelated patient shoe Neutral Unrelated 
poach lame Negative Unrelated poach lion Neutral Unrelated 
punch coward Negative Unrelated punch razor Neutral Unrelated 
quack weep Negative Unrelated quack nun Neutral Unrelated 
ram scary Negative Unrelated ram statue Neutral Unrelated 
sack argue Negative Unrelated sack lottery Neutral Unrelated 
shady offensive Negative Unrelated shady pig Neutral Unrelated 
slip weasel Negative Unrelated slip curtains Neutral Unrelated 
squash immature Negative Unrelated squash clock Neutral Unrelated 
stalk scar Negative Unrelated stalk mountain Neutral Unrelated 
stole gossip Negative Unrelated stole mail Neutral Unrelated 
strain unfair Negative Unrelated strain palace Neutral Unrelated 
strained evil Negative Unrelated strained passage Neutral Unrelated 
strike desperate Negative Unrelated strike frog Neutral Unrelated 
striking traitor Negative Unrelated striking farm Neutral Unrelated 
stub wasp Negative Unrelated stub jug Neutral Unrelated 
tackle cemetery Negative Unrelated tackle journal Neutral Unrelated 
tank snippy Negative Unrelated tank hat Neutral Unrelated 
tart stink Negative Unrelated tart key Neutral Unrelated 
terminal snob Negative Unrelated terminal elbow Neutral Unrelated 
trip tomb Negative Unrelated trip lamp Neutral Unrelated 
vice silly Negative Unrelated vice doll Neutral Unrelated 
will abuse Negative Unrelated will smooth Neutral Unrelated 
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